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
VS.

Carney R. Shegerian, Esq., State Bar No. 150461 CShegerian@Shegerianlaw.com SHEGERIAN & ASSOCIATES, INC. 225 Arizona Avenue, Suite 400 Santa Monica, California 90401

Telephone Number: (310) 860-0770 Facsimile Number: (310) 860-0771

**FILED** SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

MAR 2 3 2012



Attorneys for Plaintiff, BOBBY DEAN NICKEL

# SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, CENTRAL DISTRICT BC481391 BOBBY DEAN NICKEL. Case No.: PLAINTIFF BOBBY DEAN NICKEL'S COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES BASED ON: Plaintiff, (1) DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF AGE IN VIOLATION OF FEHA: (2) HARASSMENT ON THE BASIS OF AGE IN VIOLATION OF FEHA: (3) RETALIATION FOR COMPLAINING OF DISCRIMINATION AND HARASSMENT ON THE BASIS OF STAPLES CONTRACT & AGE IN VIOLATION OF FEHA: COMMERCIAL, INC., STAPLES, INC., LIONEL MARRERO, and (4) BREACH OF EXPRESS AND DOES 1 to 100, inclusive, IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACTS NOT TO TERMINATE EMPLOYMENT WITHOUT GOOD **CAUSE:** (5) DEFAMATION AND COMPELLED **SELF-DEFAMATION:** Defendants. DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAGE LEA/DEF#;

PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

#### **PARTIES**

- 1. Plaintiff, Bobby Dean Nickel ("plaintiff" or "Nickel") is, and at all times mentioned in this Complaint was, a resident of Los Angeles County, California.
- 2. Defendant Staples Contract & Commercial, Inc. ("Staples Contract") is, and at all times mentioned in this Complaint was, authorized to operate by the State of California and the United States government and authorized and qualified to do business in the County of Los Angeles. Staples Contract's place of business, where the following causes of action took place, was and is in the County of Los Angeles, at 16501 Trojan Way, La Mirada, California 90638.
- 3. Defendant Staples, Inc. ("Staples") is, and at all times mentioned in this Complaint was, authorized to operate by the State of California and the United States government and authorized and qualified to do business in the County of Los Angeles. Staples' place of business, where the following causes of action took place, was and is in the County of Los Angeles, at 16501 Trojan Way, La Mirada, California 90638.
- 4. Defendant Lionel Marrero ("Marrero") is, and at all times mentioned in this Complaint was, employed by Staples Contract and Staples and was plaintiff Nickel's supervisor. At all times known to plaintiff, defendant Marrero was a resident of Los Angeles County.
- 5. Defendants Does 1 through 100 are sued under fictitious names pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 474. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that each of the defendants sued under fictitious names is in some manner responsible for the wrongs and damages alleged below, in so acting was functioning as the agent, servant, partner, and employee of the co-defendants, and in taking the actions mentioned below was acting within the course and scope of his or her authority as such agent, servant, partner, and employee, with the permission and consent of the co-defendants.
  - 6. Defendants Staples Contract and Staples both directly and indirectly employed

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- 7. In addition, defendants Staples Contract and Staples compelled, coerced, aided, and abetted the discrimination, which is prohibited under California Government Code section 12940(i).
- 8. Finally, at all relevant times mentioned herein, all defendants acted as agents of all other defendants in committing the acts alleged herein.

#### INTRODUCTORY ALLEGATIONS

- 9. Plaintiff Nickel, a-64-year-old man, was employed by Corporate Express, beginning on August 19, 2002, as a facilities manager. Defendants Staples Contract and Staples acquired Corporate Express in approximately 2008. Plaintiff's direct supervisors were Chris Hampson and defendant Marrero. At all times, plaintiff performed his duties in an exemplary manner.
- 10. Corporate Express's pay scale was higher than those of Staples Contract and Staples. After the takeover, in the last 2.5 years of plaintiff's employment, defendant Marrero took steps to cut costs by firing older, higher paid employees and replacing them with less qualified, less experienced people who would work for much less, in addition to reducing hours for warehouse and maintenance employees. In management meetings, Marrero told defendants' managers, including plaintiff, to "take a good, hard look at all of the older people, and make sure they are top performers, or get rid of them."
- 11. Marrero also increased plaintiff Nickel's hours in an effort to get him to resign voluntarily. Nickel did not resign.
- 12. Nickel's duties included responsibility for maintenance, supplies, and security for the building. During the last year of his employment, his security duties were systematically eliminated.
  - 13. In 2011, Marrero announced that defendants would no longer provide cell

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phones to employees, another cost-saving measure. Thereafter, within the last three months of his employment, plaintiff Nickel was accused of hacking into employees' phones. Receptionist Carmen Kooiman told Nickel that defendants' management had tried to make her say that Nickel tried to hack into employee cell phone accounts, but that she refused.

- 14. Plaintiff Nickel was accused of theft when he took a bell pepper from the cafeteria in the building and did not pay for it promptly. He learned later that there was a problem with thefts of petty cash from California Dining, the company that operated the cafeteria, but Nickel did not know that California Dining had a petty cash fund, nor did he know about the thefts of cash at the time he took the pepper. Nevertheless, three weeks before Nickel's employment was terminated, defendants—not California Dining—accused him of "stealing from the cafeteria." Defendants' security chief, Jason Daniels, told Nickel, "We got you. You're a thief; we got you."
- 15. Thereafter, Nickel was suspended for three days. After he returned to work, on July 29, 2011, defendants abruptly terminated his employment for "continued disregard of [Staples'] Ethics policy" and "conduct unbecoming a Manager," with no explanation.
- 16. Plaintiff believes and alleges that defendants terminated his employment in part because of his age and the fact that he earned more money than younger employees.

#### FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

#### (Discrimination on the Basis of Age

#### (Government Code § 12940, et. seq.)—Against

#### **Defendants Staples Contract and Staples)**

- 17. The allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 16 are re-alleged and incorporated herein by reference.
- 18. At all times herein mentioned, FEHA, Government Code section 12940, et. seq., was in full force and effect and was binding on defendants. This statute requires defendants to refrain from discriminating against any employee on the basis of his or her

being more than 40 years old. Within the time provided by law, plaintiff filed a complaint with the DFEH, in full compliance with administrative requirements, and received a right-to-sue letter.

- 19. During plaintiff Nickel's employment with defendants, defendants, through their supervisors, engaged in actions that had a negative impact on the treatment of employees who were more than 40 years old. Specifically, defendants discharged older employees with greater frequency than younger employees, hired fewer employees who were older than 40, and gave better jobs and benefits to younger employees.
- 20. During plaintiff's employment with defendants, defendants intentionally engaged in age discrimination by discharging employees over the age of 40 with greater frequency than other employees. During plaintiff's employment with defendants, defendants had a pattern and practice of discriminating against employees who were more than 40 years old.
- 21. Plaintiff Nickel was a qualified employee at the time of the termination of his employment, he was more than 40 years old, and he was replaced by an employee younger than 40, raising an inference of discrimination.
- 22. Defendants, through their managers and supervisors, made a number of comments to and about plaintiff Nickel that exhibited ageist motivations, intentions, and consciousness. Plaintiff believes and on that basis alleges defendants' real motivation was to discharge him because of his age.
- 23. On the basis of the above, plaintiff believes and alleges that his age was a motivating factor in defendants' termination of his employment.
- 24. As a proximate result of defendants' willful, knowing, and intentional discrimination against plaintiff, plaintiff has sustained and continues to sustain substantial losses of earnings and other employment benefits.
- 25. As a proximate result of defendants' willful, knowing, and intentional discrimination against plaintiff, plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer humiliation, emotional distress, and mental and physical pain and anguish, all to his damage in a sum

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according to proof.

- 26. Defendants' discrimination was done intentionally, in a malicious, oppressive manner, entitling plaintiff to punitive damages.
- 27. Plaintiff has incurred and continues to incur legal expenses and attorneys' fees. Plaintiff is at present unaware of the precise amounts of these expenses and fees and will seek leave of court to amend this Complaint when the amounts are fully known.

#### SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

### (Harassment on the Basis of Age (Government Code § 12940—Against Defendants Staples Contract, Staples, and Marrero)

- 28. The allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 27 are re-alleged and incorporated herein by reference.
- 29. At all times herein mentioned, FEHA, Government Code section 12940(j)(1) and 12940(j)(3), was in full force and effect and was binding on defendants. This statute requires defendants to refrain from harassing any employee on the basis of being more than 40 years old. Within the time provided by law, plaintiff filed a complaint with the DFEH, in full compliance with administrative requirements, and received a right-to-sue letter.
- 30. Defendants engaged in actions to harass plaintiff because of his age. Defendants directed numerous comments to plaintiff, as was stated above, shunned him in daily activities, refused to involve him in various projects, and took other actions directed toward plaintiff.
- 31. As a proximate result of defendants' willful, knowing, and intentional harassment, plaintiff sustained damages in a sum according to proof.
- 32. As a proximate result of defendants' willful, knowing, and intentional harassment, plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer humiliation, emotional distress, and mental and physical pain and anguish, all to his damage in a sum according to proof.
  - 33. Defendants' harassment of plaintiff was done intentionally, in a malicious,

oppressive manner, entitling plaintiff to punitive damages.

34. Plaintiff has incurred and continues to incur legal expenses and attorneys' fees. Plaintiff is at present unaware of the precise amounts of these expenses and fees and will seek leave of court to amend this Complaint when the amounts are fully known.

#### THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

### (Retaliation for Complaining of Discrimination and Harassment on the Basis of Age (Government Code § 12940(h)—Against Defendants Staples Contract and Staples)

- 35. The allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 34 are re-alleged and incorporated herein by reference.
- 36. At all times herein mentioned, FEHA, Government Code section 12940(h), was in full force and effect and was binding on defendants. This statute requires defendants to refrain from retaliating against employees for complaining of discrimination or harassment. Prior to filing the instant Complaint, plaintiff Nickel filed a timely administrative charge with the DFEH and received a right-to-sue notice.
- 37. Plaintiff believes and on that basis alleges that his complaints about discrimination and harassment because of his age were a factor in defendants' termination of his employment.
- 38. As a proximate result of defendants' willful, knowing, and intentional retaliation against plaintiff, plaintiff has sustained and continues to sustain substantial losses of earnings and other employment benefits.
- 39. As a proximate result of defendants' willful, knowing, and intentional retaliation against plaintiff, plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer humiliation, emotional distress, and physical and mental pain and anguish, all to his damage in a sum according to proof.
  - 40. Plaintiff has incurred and continues to incur legal expenses and attorneys' fees.

Plaintiff is at present unaware of the precise amounts of these expenses and fees and will seek leave of court to amend this Complaint when the amounts are fully known.

41. Defendants' misconduct was done intentionally, in a malicious, despicable, oppressive manner, entitling plaintiff to punitive damages against defendants.

#### FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Breach of Express and Implied-in-Fact Contracts Not to Terminate Employment Without Good Cause (Walker v. Blue Cross (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 985)—Against Defendants Staples Contract and Staples)

- 42. The allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 41 are re-alleged and incorporated herein by reference.
- 43. Defendants, through their agents, entered into an express oral agreement with plaintiff not to terminate plaintiff's employment except for good cause. Defendants represented to plaintiff that his employment would not be terminated unless his job performance were unsatisfactory. Plaintiff agreed and promised to work for defendants on the basis of these promises and agreed to continue to work for defendants on the basis of these promises. Plaintiff performed all duties required of him under this agreement.
- 44. On the basis of the length of plaintiff's employment with defendants, his exemplary work record, his merit raises and promotion, defendants' oral assurances of continued employment, and the policy and practice in defendants' industry of terminating employment only for good cause, an implied-in-fact contract existed between plaintiff and defendants. This contract required that defendants have good cause for terminating plaintiff's employment.
- 45. Defendants and their supervisors terminated plaintiff's employment without good cause, violating the express and implied-in-fact contracts they had with him.
- 46. As a proximate result of defendants' willful breach of the express and impliedin-fact contracts not to terminate employment without good cause, plaintiff has suffered

and continues to suffer loss of earnings and benefits, all to his damage in a sum according to proof.

- 47. Plaintiff has incurred and continues to incur legal expenses and attorneys' fees. Plaintiff is at present unaware of the precise amounts of these expenses and fees and will seek leave of court to amend this Complaint when the amounts are fully known.
- 48. Plaintiff seeks attorneys' fees for lost wages under this cause of action under Labor Code section 218.6.

#### FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

## (Defamation and Compelled Self-Defamation (Civil Code §§ 45, 46)—Against Defendants

#### **Staples Contract and Staples**)

- 49. The allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 48 are re-alleged and incorporated herein by reference.
- 50. Defendants falsely informed individuals other than plaintiff that plaintiff was fired for stealing, i.e. a theft, from defendants. However, these statements were not true; in fact, defendants' real reason for terminating plaintiff's employment was their desire to get rid of older employees who earned more. This representation constituted defamation per se, imputing to plaintiff a crime and/or loathsome action involving his profession.
- 51. When defendants made this false representation, they knew that plaintiff would be under a strong compulsion to repeat this comment to prospective employers. Plaintiff was and is under such a compulsion and has told prospective employers of defendants' defamatory comment.
- 52. As a result of defendants' willful, knowing, and intentional false representations about plaintiff, plaintiff has been injured in his profession and continues to be injured in his profession. Plaintiff has sustained and continues to sustain losses of earnings and other employment benefits.
  - 53. As a proximate result of defendants' willful, knowing, and intentional false rep-

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resentations about plaintiff, plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer humiliation, mental pain and anguish, and other non-economic damages, all to his damage in a sum according to proof.

54. Defendants' misconduct was done intentionally, in a malicious, despicable, oppressive manner, entitling plaintiff to punitive damages against defendants.

WHEREFORE, plaintiff, Bobby Dean Nickel, prays for judgment against defendants as follows:

- 1. For general and special damages according to proof;
- 2. For exemplary damages according to proof;
- 3. For pre-judgment and post-judgment interest on all damages awarded;
- 4. For reasonable attorneys' fees;
- 5. For costs of suit incurred;
- 6. For such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.

ADDITIONALLY, plaintiff, Bobby Dean Nickel, demands trial of this matter by jury.

Dated: March 23, 2012

SHEGERIAN & ASSOCIATES, INC.

By:

Carney & Shegerian, Esq.

Attorneys for Plaintiff, BOBBY DEAN NICKEL