The Underused, Highly Powered Employment Claim in D.C., Maryland, & Virginia

By Adam Augustine Carter and Charles Early

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For weeks millions were glued to the Johnny Depp-Amber Heard trial, an edge-of-your seat courtroom drama that was dissected by seasoned lawyers and social media influencers alike. Beneath the celebrity spectacle, the case centered on a single legal claim: defamation.

Defamation can arise in the workplace when an employer or supervisor makes untrue accusations about an employee’s performance, conduct, or integrity. A defamation claim may accompany other employment law claims such as wrongful termination or retaliation.

But while other employment claims are often pursued in federal court, defamation claims can open the door to state court — a more favorable place to be as an individual plaintiff. Defamation claims also provide options for suing supervisors and receiving reputational damages as monetary compensation.

For employees considering legal action, the key question is this: When do workplace statements cross the line from internal criticism or evaluation into legally actionable defamation?

What is Defamation?

The most general definition is that defamation is a false statement that has damaged someone’s reputation. You may have heard the words “slander” or “libel” before. Both words are defamation, but they specify the method in which the defamation was conveyed. “Slander” is spoken, and “libel” is written.

Every jurisdiction in the U.S. recognizes defamation as a justifiable reason for litigation, although the requirements for a defamation case can vary slightly. Each jurisdiction also has its own statute of limitations &mdash the deadline by which an employee must file a claim for defamation or that claim will be forever lost. In D.C.,[1] Maryland,[2] and Virginia,[3] the statute of limitations is one year.

Some jurisdictions have additional rules depending on the type of defamation. Those jurisdictions distinguish between defamation per quod (where a plaintiff must prove the defamation caused them harm) and defamation per se (where, if proven, the defamation is so egregious that the damages are presumed). We’ll explore those two types in the “Damages” section below.

Basic Requirements of a Defamation Case

Although the standards vary from state to state, employees working to prove defamation in most contexts generally must show that (1) a false and defamatory statement concerning the employee was (2) published to a third party (3) in a manner that was at least negligent and (4) that statement damaged the employee (unless the statement was so severely and obviously damaging that the plaintiff does not have to prove damages, as with defamation per se).[4]

Let’s break down each of those conceptual elements to determine whether a workplace statement rises to the level of defamation.

Statement: A statement is generally anything that is spoken (including sign language) or written. Again, “slander” would be a spoken (or signed) statement, and “libel” would be a written statement.

False: To be defamation, a statement regarding the employee must be factually incorrect. It cannot be a matter of opinion. Statements like “the employee is ugly” are rude but only an opinion. A statement like “Jeff is always late,” however, could be a false statement of fact. Compare that statement to the very similar “I believe Jeff is never on time.” The former is presented as a fact, and the latter is an opinion; therefore, the former may be defamation, and the latter is not.

Published: A statement generally is published if it is communicated to a third party. Spoken or signed statements may be shared in person or via audio and video communication services, such as phone or Zoom calls. A written statement may be a physical page that is handwritten or typed, a digital document, or a digital message (like an email) that is then delivered to a third party.

Third party: For a defamation case, the false statement must be communicated to another individual besides the employee it concerns. A conversation between the person who makes the statement and the employee is not defamation until and unless the person making the statement publishes it to someone else.

Negligent: The speaker of the statement usually can’t be held liable for defamation unless the employee can show that the speaker was at least careless about whether it was true. This generally can be proved by showing that the speaker ignored contradictory evidence, that they failed to verify the information before they published it to a third-party or that they failed to perform any fact-checking where a reasonable person would.

Special Requirements in the DMV

Different jurisdictions have different rules about the details that must be included when someone files a lawsuit.

Virginia requires that defamation claims be “plead with precision.” In practice, this means the complaint must include:

• The exact words of the allegedly defamatory statement(s) or the document containing the statement(s);[5]
• Who made or published the statement;
• When the statement was published; and
• To whom the statement was communicated.

Importantly, Virginia courts do not recognize innuendos beyond the ordinary plain meaning of the words. Plaintiffs are not allowed to expand upon the meaning to show it’s defamatory.[6]

Washington, D.C.’s requirements are less stringent than Virginia’s. A defamation complaint must still include the following information but not to the level of specificity required by Virginia:

• The allegedly defamatory statement(s);
• Who made the statement;
• When the statement was published;
• To whom the statement was communicated; and
• How the statement was communicated.[7]

Maryland falls between Virginia and D.C. in terms of how much detail a plaintiff must include when filing a claim. Courts generally require plaintiffs to provide enough factual detail to support each element of defamation. Under Maryland law, a plaintiff must show that:

• A false statement was made about the plaintiff;
• The statement was published to a third party;
• The speaker was at least negligent regarding the truth; and
• The plaintiff’s reputation was harmed as a result of the statement.[8]

Damages

If a person proves defamation, the law allows them to seek compensation for several kinds of harm called “damages.”

So-called “special” damages are economic losses resulting from the defamation. In an employment context, this generally includes loss of employment (or job offer), reduced earnings, and other out-of-pocket losses caused by the defamatory statement. Examples of out-of-pocket losses include job search expenses, relocation costs for new employment, or costs incurred to address or correct the false statement.

“General” damages are those that can’t be quickly or easily quantified because they are non-economic in nature, which can include reputational harm, humiliation, and mental and physical anguish.

Whether an employee needs to prove damage occurred depends on whether the defamation is considered per quod or per se.

Defamation per quod is the more common type of defamation and requires proof of how the false statements caused harm to the employee. For example, an employee could show that they lost promotions, received negative performance evaluations, or were fired because of the defamation. Constructive termination (where the false statements result in an employee self-terminating their employment) could also be a provable damage. Unlike its per se cousin, defamation per quod requires an employee to allege how they were damaged in their complaint against the employer.

Defamation per se, in contrast, requires no proof of actual damages because some statements are considered so inherently harmful that the law assumes they damaged a person’s reputation. These include but are not limited to false statements that the plaintiff is unfit for their profession, is infected with certain diseases, or that they committed a crime. Historically, statements about infidelity have also been considered defamation per se.

Again, keep in mind that the false statement must be presented as fact to be considered defamation. “Jeff robbed the corner store” is stated like a fact, but “I think Jeff robbed the corner store” is a person’s opinion that Jeff may have robbed the corner store.

In cases of defamation per se, plaintiffs are sometimes entitled to presumed damages. Presumed damages may not be an option in cases involving a media organization as a defendant or matters of public concern — unless the employee can show “actual malice.” They would need to prove that the defendant had actual knowledge that the statements were false or made the statements with reckless disregard as to whether they were true.[9]

In some defamation cases, a plaintiff may be awarded punitive damages, which are designed to punish particularly egregious conduct and discourage similar behavior in the future. In most jurisdictions, an award of punitive damages requires that the plaintiff prove the employer’s statement(s) were made with actual malice.

Unlike many jurisdictions, Virginia allows for damages against an employer to be mitigated. The damages awarded may be reduced if the defendant in a defamation case apologizes to the plaintiff or retracts the defamatory statement.[10] However, Virginia law requires that the apology at least be attempted before the lawsuit is filed or as soon as possible thereafter.

Employer Privileges

Employees often encounter workplace statements that seem to be defamatory and appear to meet the required elements. A defamation claim may still fail, however, if the statement is protected by a legal doctrine called “privilege.”

There are several situations in which employers or supervisors are permitted to make statements without the risk of being sued for any resulting adverse consequences — again, unless the statement was made with malice.[11] As with many factors, different jurisdictions recognize different kinds of privilege.

Qualified/common-interest privilege: This type of privilege exists when the person making the statement and the person to whom it is communicated have a common interest in the information. The speaker must also be acting within the scope of their job. This most often occurs when someone makes a good-faith report about an employee to a supervisor or human resources representative. The communication is protected if it is only originally shared within the organization and made with honest, good intentions.[12]

Judicial proceedings privilege: D.C. recognizes absolute privilege for litigation and judicial proceedings.[13] This means that statements made during court proceedings — and likely during administrative proceedings — generally cannot give rise to a defamation case.[14] Virginia[15] and Maryland[16] recognize similar protections, though they may not cover as broad of a category as D.C. does.

Statutory immunities: Many jurisdictions, including Maryland and Virginia, have laws that protect employers who make statements in good faith (even if potentially defamatory in nature).[17] As with other forms of privilege, statutory protections may be lost when the employer (or its agents) acts with malice. D.C. does not have similar legislation in place, but protections have been established by previous case decisions.

Defamation in the Workplace

Workplace defamation can sometimes be tricky to argue. The most common places for defamation to occur — such as human resources communications or termination meetings — are often protected by privilege. This doesn’t mean you should write it off immediately, however. There can still be options for a successful case.

Internal HR communications & performance evaluations

Courts have determined that internal human resources communications are generally protected by qualified privilege.[18] Qualified privilege, however, can be lost if:

• The speaker acted with malice, meaning they intended to harm the employee;
• The statement was shared beyond those who reasonably needed to receive it (for example, through a company-wide email rather than communication contained between the supervisor and HR);
• The speaker knew the statement was false; or
• The speaker recklessly ignored information suggesting the statement was false.

Termination and investigation communications

Defamation claims can also arise out of termination meetings, explanatory letters, and investigation summaries. For each of these scenarios, qualified privilege typically exists, too, unless the employee proves malice, excessive publication (e.g., email blast or similar occurrence), or the supervisor’s statements were knowingly or recklessly false.[19]

Post-employment references

Sometimes the defamation doesn’t occur until after you’re no longer working for an employer. Let’s say you list your former employer as a reference on a job application. What if they make false and defamatory statements to a prospective employer? Jurisdictions vary regarding how they address this situation. Maryland and Virginia legally protect employers who disclose information about a former employee’s performance and reason for termination, provided that the former employer acts in good faith.[20] Employers lose this protection if they intentionally or knowingly disclose false information about an employee.[21] D.C. does not have a comparable statute, but previous cases show that courts will similarly protect employers.

Statements made to government bodies

In most cases, statements made to government bodies regarding an employee are privileged or protected by law. A speaker often cannot be held liable for anything they say during unemployment hearings, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) proceedings, or other government proceedings.

Many of these proceedings require individuals to testify under oath or to attest to their statements under penalty of perjury. False statements in these situations can lead to criminal penalties, so the law generally assumes that witnesses are testifying in good faith unless proven otherwise. Additionally, granting immunity against defamation encourages people to provide complete and candid information that may be relevant to the proceeding. Courts recognize that participants in these proceedings should be able to speak freely without fear of defamation lawsuits.

D.C., Maryland, and Virginia all recognize privileges for statements made in judicial or administrative proceedings, but Virginia is unique in that its law goes a step further to specifically protect statements in unemployment hearings.

Who Can Be Sued for Defamation

Employers (or former employers) usually can be held liable for the defamatory statements of their employees if the speaker who made the defamatory statement was acting within the scope of their job.[22] In some circumstances, plaintiffs can also sue the individual who made the statement, such as their supervisor or the human resources investigator.

Claims against an employer: When suing an employer, the employee must name the proper entity and then allege that the speaker acted within the course and scope of their employment when making the statement. In many cases, an employee should also consider bringing a claim for negligent hiring and/or retention if possible. See the “Additional Claims” section below for a brief explanation.

Claims against an individual: To sue an individual, a plaintiff has to overcome the issue of qualified privilege. They must either show that the speaker acted with malice or excessively published the defamatory statement (nullifying the privilege) or that the speaker acted outside of their job responsibilities (in which case, qualified privilege never applied).[23] When suing an individual, a plaintiff must name the speaker(s) personally.

Potential Employer Defenses

When an employee brings a defamation claim, the employer or supervisor is likely to assert that they didn’t do anything legally wrong — even if they acknowledge that the statement occurred. Defendants often argue that the statement was true or protected by privilege. The following are some of the most common defenses raised in defamation cases.

Truth: Truth is an absolute defense against defamation.[24] The first element of defamation requires that the statement be false, so if the statement is not false, then the employee has not been defamed. However, it’s on the defendant to prove that the statement was true. As an example, let’s say Marcus was an employee at a Virginia hospital. Marcus’s medical license became suspended in Virginia, so the hospital fired him because he could not practice medicine. The hospital also notified the National Practitioner Data Bank of Marcus’s suspended license. If Marcus sues the hospital for defamation, the hospital would have to present documentation and testimony from the state licensing board to prove that Marcus’s license was, in fact, suspended.

Substantial truth: An employer might argue that the statement contains some inaccuracies but is mostly true in overall substance. A statement being substantially true (even if not 100% true) undercuts several of the required elements for a defamation case. If a statement is mostly true, then is it really considered false? Moreover, a substantially true statement can’t have been made negligently because there was enough care taken in making the statement for it to have come out only partially untrue. It can also be argued that a substantially true statement could not have damaged the employee. Again, however, the defendant has to first prove that the statement was substantially true, and there’s a lot of gray area. Whether a statement is substantially true is typically a question for the jury to decide.

Opinion: As we’ve touched on, opinions are not statements of fact and generally cannot support a defamation claim. They are protected by the First Amendment. If employees were allowed to sue because of opinions, courts would become paralyzed by the sheer volume of defamation lawsuits. The defendant does still bear the burden of proving that their statement is an opinion, but this is reasonably easy because of the many hallmarks that distinguish opinions from objective facts.

Consent: If an employee consents to the statement being shared, the employer generally cannot be held liable for defamation. Perhaps the statement is false, widely published, and actually damaging for the employee. But consent means that the employee authorized the publication of the statement, therefore either confirming the veracity of the statement or absolving the employer of any negligence they may have committed in making the statement. Once an employee has given consent, they cannot then come back and hold the employer liable when the statement harms them.

Anti-SLAPP

A SLAPP — short for “strategic lawsuit against public participation”[25] — is a lawsuit filed primarily to intimidate or silence someone who has spoken out on an issue of public concern. These lawsuits are often brought by individuals or companies with greater financial resources in the hopes of forcing critics to spend more time and money defending the case rather than continuing to speak out. Defamation claims are frequently used in SLAPP lawsuits.

To address this problem, at least 30 states have enacted anti-SLAPP laws, which allow SLAPP victims to ask a court to dismiss these lawsuits early in the case.

However, anti-SLAPP laws can operate as a double-edged sword. They were designed to protect individuals who speak out on matters of public interest, but employers may use these same laws to try to dismiss valid defamation claims brought by employees. In those situations, the employer might argue that the employee wasn’t defamed but is instead trying to punish the employer’s protected speech. The employee would then be required to prove the merits of their case earlier in the litigation process than otherwise.

The strength of anti-SLAPP protections varies by jurisdiction. D.C. has one of the most robust anti-SLAPP statutes and provides broad protection for speech on matters of public interest. Defendants may be able to invoke the statute even when the alleged defamation occurred in private settings, such as workplace communications or internal emails.[26] Maryland’s anti-SLAPP law is more limited and primarily applies to statements made to the government or the public.[27]

Virginia takes a somewhat different approach. Virginia law grants immunity to individuals who make certain protected statements, including statements:

• About matters of public concern that would be protected under the First Amendment;
• Made at a public hearing before a governmental body authorized by the Commonwealth;
• Made during a Title IX hearing; or
• Made by an employee about an employer in situations where retaliation for such statements is prohibited by law.[28]

However, the immunity can be lost if the speaker knows the statement is false.[29]

Additional Claims Employees Often Bring Alongside Defamation

False light: This claim arises when an individual is portrayed publicly in a way that is false and highly offensive to a reasonable person. False light differs from defamation because it requires the offensive portrayal to be widely publicized, such as deepfake adult content published on social media. This action is recognized in D.C.[30] and Maryland[31] but not in Virginia.

Tortious interference with prospective/at-will employment: Tortious interference claims arise when an individual causes harm to the plaintiff’s at-will employment (or offer of employment). Some people have qualified privilege to make reports to someone’s employer, but those who do not — either because they don’t have a relevant workplace relationship or because they acted with malice — could be seen as interfering with the contractual relationship between employer and employee. This would occur if their defamatory statement caused the employer to demote, dismiss, or otherwise modify the employee’s job. The speaker who made the defamatory statement doesn’t need to work for the same employer to potentially be liable for this claim. A jilted ex-partner who contacted an employer and made accusations that cost the employee their job could be sued for tortious interference. The bar for this type of claim is low, only requiring proof of negligence. D.C., Maryland, and Virginia all recognize tortious interference claims in different forms.

Intentional infliction of emotional distress: Intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) is recognized in D.C., Maryland, and Virginia. To prove an IIED claim, a plaintiff must show that the defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous, that it was intentional or reckless, and that it caused extreme emotional distress to the plaintiff. When possible, claims for IIED pair well with defamation because the requirements for proving malice are similar.

Negligent hiring/retention: This type of claim alleges that the employer knew (or reasonably should have known) the unfitness of the employee it hired and, as such, is liable for the harm the employee causes. If a supervisor defames an employee, the employee may be able to argue that the employer’s negligence in hiring that supervisor contributed to the harm they experienced. Courts in D.C., Maryland, and Virginia all recognize claims for negligent hiring and/or retention.[32]

Wrongful/abusive discharge: These kinds of claims may be available if the employee was actually (or constructively) terminated — if the termination also violated public policy. D.C., Maryland,[33] and Virginia all have variations of wrongful or abusive discharge.

Insulting words: Virginia is unique among the three jurisdictions discussed here in that it recognizes a claim for “insulting words.”[34] This claim is frequently pled alongside defamation in Virginia because it is so similar to defamation and is codified in statute. However, the claim is narrow and requires showing that the exact words were intended to insult the plaintiff.

DMV Distinctions Worth Noting

Complaint requirements: Virginia requires the highest level of detail in a defamation complaint, requesting the exact words or actual document containing the defamation. D.C. and Maryland are less strict but still require that the claims be specific.

Immunity/privilege: As discussed above, Maryland and Virginia provide certain statutory protections for employers who make employment-related statements in good faith. Similar immunity in D.C. is established by case decisions rather than statutes, but the result is almost the same. In all three jurisdictions, protections may be lost if the speaker acted with malice.

Proceedings privilege: Virginia grants absolute privilege for statements made during unemployment hearings. Agency and other tribunal communications are carefully analyzed across all three jurisdictions to determine whether they are privileged or otherwise immune from liability.

Anti-SLAPP: A defendant in a defamation case has the best chance of getting the case dismissed using an anti-SLAPP statute in D.C. Anti-SLAPP protections in Maryland are limited to situations where the accused individual made statements to the public or to a government body. Virginia is even more specific about which statements may be protected by anti-SLAPP statutes.

Questions to Consider Before Bringing a Defamation Claim

• What was the defamatory statement? Are you able to identify what was specifically said (and, if possible, the exact words said)?
• Who made the statement? Was the statement made by a supervisor, coworker, or another individual, and were they acting within the scope of their employment?
• Was the statement shared with others? Who was the audience, and how was the statement communicated (for example, in a meeting, email, or report)?
• Could the statement be protected by privilege? For example, was it made in an HR investigation, during litigation, or in another situation where the law may protect certain communications?
• What harm resulted from the statement? Did you lose a job opportunity, experience reputational harm, or suffer other damages?
• Could anti-SLAPP laws apply? In some jurisdictions — especially Washington, D.C., and Virginia — defendants may try to dismiss defamation claims early by arguing that the lawsuit targets protected speech.

The variations of privileges and anti-SLAPP protections available in each jurisdiction make workplace defamation complicated to navigate, but a solid defamation claim can not only help your case for other employment law grievances but also open the door for more compensation.

If your job has been impacted by a defamatory statement, contact The Employment Law Group today

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[1] D.C. Code § 12-301(a)(4).
[2] Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-105.
[3] Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-247.1.
[4] Oparaugo v. Watts, 884 A.2d 63 (D.C. 2005); Piscatelli v. Van Smith, 35 A.3d 1140 (Md. 2012); Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, 229 Va. 1, 325 S.E.2d 713 (1985).
[5] Bennett v. Lundh, 916 S.E.2d 356 (Va. Ct. App. 2015).
[6] Schaecher v. Bouffault, 772 S.E.2d 589 (Va. 2015).
[7] See Crowley v. N. Am. Trans. Ass’n, 691 A.2d 1169 (D.C. 1996).
[8] See generally Batson v. Shiflett, 602 A.2d 1191 (Md. 1992).
[9] See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
[10] Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-46.
[11] See Larimore v. Blaylock, 528 S.E.2d 119 (Va. 2000); Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 350 A.2d 688 (Md. 1976); Payne v. Clark, 25 A.3d 918 (D.C. 2011).
[12] See Larimore v. Blaylock, 528 S.E.2d 119 (Va. 2000); Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 350 A.2d 688 (Md. 1976); Payne v. Clark, 25 A.3d 918 (D.C. 2011).
[13] See D.C. Code § 16-4203 (communications in mediation are privileged and excluded from tort liability); D.C. Code § 4-1705.01 (communications to and with an attorney referral service are privileged); see Finkelstein, Thompson & Loughran v. Hemispherx Biopharma, Inc., 774 A.2d 332, 338 (D.C. 2001).
[14] Messina v. Fontana, 260 F.Supp.2d 173, 178 (D.D.C. 2003).
[15] Katz v. Odin, Feldman & Pittleman, P.C., 332 F.Supp.2d 909 (E.D. Va. 2004); Penick v. Ratcliffe, 149 Va. 618 (1927); Spencer v. Looney, 116 Va. 767, 82 S.E. 745 (1914).
[16] See generally Day v. Johns Hopkins Health Sys. Corp., 907 F.3d 766 (4th Cir. 2018); see Norman v. Borison, 418 Md. 630, 658 (2011); Mixter v. Farmer, 215 Md. App. 536, 543 (2013) (“an absolute privilege for attorneys to make potentially defamatory statements if the statements have some rational relationship to the judicial proceedings.”)
[17] Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-423; Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-46.1.
[18] See Larimore v. Blaylock, 528 S.E.2d 119 (Va. 2000); Raytheon Tech. Servs. v. Hyland, 614 S.E.2d 84 (Va. 2004).
[19] See Crowley v. N. Am. Trans. Ass’n, 691 A.2d 1169 (D.C. 1996).
[20] Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-423; Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-46.1.
[21] Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-423(b); Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-46.1.
[22] See Debastian v. Dist. of Columbia, 636 A.2d 958 (D.C. 1994); Giant of Va. v. Pigg, 152 S.E.2d 271 (Va. 1967); see generally Barclay v. Briscoe, 47 A.3d 560 (Md. 2012) (collecting Maryland cases establishing the common law doctrine for respondeat superior).
[23] See e.g., Armstrong v. Thompson, 80 A.3d 177 (D.C. 2013).
[24] Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-46; Alexandria Gazette Corp. v. West, 93 S.E.2d 274 (Va. 1956); M & S Furniture Sales Co. v. De Bartolo Corp., 241 A.2d 126 (Md. 1968); see also New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
[25] Pring, George William; Canan, Penelope (1996). SLAPPs: Getting Sued for Speaking Out. Temple University Press.
[26] D.C. Code § 16-5501 et seq.
[27] Md. Cts. & & Jud. Proc. § 5-807.
[28] Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-223.2(A).
[29] Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-223.2(B).
[30] See Desbach v. Doubleday & Co., 518 F. Supp. 1285 (D.D.C. 1981); Kitt v. Capital Concerts, Inc., 742 A.2d 856 (D.C. 1999); Lane v. Random House, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 141 (D.D.C. 1995).
[31] See Crowley v. Fox Broadcasting Co., 851 F. Supp. 700 (D. Md. 1994); Prince George’s County v. Longtin, 19 A.3d 859 (Md. 2011).
[32] Negligent hiring: see Sebastian v. Dist. of Columbia, 636 A.2d 958 (D.C. 1994); Asphalt & Concrete Servs., Inc. v. Perry, 108 A.3d 558 (Md. App. 2015); Southeast Apartments Mgmt., Inc. v. Jackman, 513 S.E.2d 395 (Va. 1999); Negligent retention: Williams v. Dist. of Columbia, 916 F. Supp 1 (D.D.C. 1996); see Economides v. Gay, 155 F. Supp. 2d 485 (D. Md. 2001); Doe v. Baker, 857 S.E.2d 573 (Va. 2021).
[33] See Adler v. Am. Standard Corp., 830 F.2d 1303 (4th Cir. 1987).
[34] Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-45.

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Adam Augustine Carter is a principal of The Employment Law Group, P.C.; Charles Early is an associate at the firm.

By Anita Mazumdar Chambers and Kirsten Fetrow

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Non-competitive agreements and other restrictive covenants have long been used by employers to restrict former employees’ ability to work for competitors, solicit clients, or start rival businesses. Attempts have been made to ban or limit the scope of these agreements, but it’s a continuing battle.

A federal rule that would have limited non-compete agreements nationwide was swiftly struck down by a Texas court in April of 2024. The rule’s sudden rise and fall left employees and employers wondering whether their own agreements were still enforceable.

In Washington, D.C., Maryland, and Virginia, non-competes are indeed still legally enforceable. However, state laws have restricted — and in some cases, complicated — these agreements. There is some wiggle room for employees to fight against unfair clauses.

Federal Backdrop

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued a rule in April of 2024 banning most non-compete clauses in employment agreements, stating that they were an “unfair method of competition.” Even employees who are not subject to non-competes can be negatively impacted by their existence.

According to the FTC, non-compete agreements suppress wages across the labor market and stifle competition.[1] The agency estimated that its non-compete ban would have boosted workers’ earnings by more than $400 billion over a decade by enabling greater job mobility for employees or giving them more leverage for wage negotiations in their existing jobs. The restrictions imposed by non-competes can not only limit an individual’s job growth but also keep an industry’s standard pay rate lower than it would be if employees had more power.

The FTC’s non-compete rule faced significant legal challenges. In Ryan LLC v. FTC, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas determined that the FTC didn’t have the statutory authority to make substantive rules against non-compete clauses.[2] The court vacated the FTC’s rule, stating that the ban was overly broad and would have made most non-competes unenforceable. Under the Trump administration, the FTC abandoned efforts to defend its ban. The commission dismissed its appeals in Ryan LLC v. FTC and Properties of the Villages v. FTC in September of 2025.

Jennifer Abruzzo, former general counsel of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), also opposed non-competes. She issued two memoranda — one in 2023 and one in 2024 — stating that restrictions like non-competes were unlawful and violated the National Labor Relations Act. However, these memoranda were rescinded on February 14, 2025, by the acting NLRB general counsel, William B. Cowen.

Nevertheless, the FTC continued to combat deceptive labor practices through the creation of a Joint Labor Task Force that intends to target case-by-case enforcement of anticompetitive practices.

Federal enforcement efforts are uncertain and limited, however. State law thus remains the primary source of authority when determining the enforceability of non-competes. In the DMV area, approaches to non-competes vary significantly.

Washington, D.C.

Washington, D.C., has largely restricted non-compete agreements, but there are exceptions based on the type of employee or the wages they receive.

The D.C. Ban on Non-Compete Agreements Amendment Act of 2020 protects employees from being required to sign non-compete agreements. The Act prohibits retaliation against those who refuse to sign and includes other protections, including a requirement for employers to notify employees of any non-compete provisions at least 14 days before execution.

However, the law went into effect on October 1, 2022, and only applies to non-compete agreements signed on that date or thereafter. If an employee willingly signed an agreement before October of 2022, the non-compete is valid and enforceable. Non-competes signed after the Act’s effective date are not enforceable (with some exceptions).

The Act defines an employee as an individual who works in D.C. on behalf of an employer or a prospective employee whom the employer reasonably anticipates will work in D.C. In other words, D.C.’s ban on non-competes protects:

• Employees who spend 50% or more of their time working in D.C., or
• Employees who spend a substantial amount of their time working for an employer based in D.C.

The Act does not protect people such as volunteers or members elected or appointed to office for a religious organization and engaged in religious functions.

People earning above a certain wage threshold are considered “highly compensated employees” and can also be subject to non-compete agreements.[3] The threshold changes each year based on the Department of Labor’s Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers in the Washington Metropolitan Statistical Area. At the time of publishing this article, “highly compensated employees” are those expected to earn about $162,164 or more in a consecutive 12-month period. Medical specialists are allowed a higher threshold. They would need to make at least $270,274 for a non-compete to be enforceable.

Broadcast employees — such as anchors, reporters, and producers — are an exception to the exception. They cannot be held to non-compete agreements no matter how much money they make.

Employees who fall under the listed exceptions aren’t fully protected by D.C.’s ban, but their non-compete agreements must include the following to be enforceable:[4]

1. The function and scope of the competitive restriction, which must specify the service, industry, role, or competing entity;
2. The restriction’s geographic scope; and
3. The length of the restriction, which cannot exceed 365 days from the employee’s separation (or 730 days if the employee is a medical specialist.)

D.C.’s broad ban against non-competes means that many D.C. employees can’t be held to a non-compete agreement. D.C. courts, however, permit employers to use alternative restrictions — such as anti-solicitation, anti-disclosure, and confidentiality agreements — if they protect business interests without causing undue restraint on competition.

In Morgan Stanley DW Inc. v. Rothe,[5] the court determined that the non-solicitation agreement was reasonable because it only restricted the former employee from competing within a 100-mile radius for a year and did not prevent the company’s former clients from reaching out to the employee (although vice versa was prohibited). Several court cases have found that non-solicitation agreements are a legitimate way to protect a business[6] and that courts must consider the potential impact on the business’s interests before invalidating the agreements.[7]

D.C.’s non-compete ban was modified in July of 2022, allowing for non-disclosure agreements that would ban former employees from using a company’s confidential and proprietary information. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia has additionally recognized that it’s in the public’s interest to protect confidential business information and trade secrets.[8]

Maryland

Maryland generally bans non-competes for low-wage workers and certain jobs. Under Maryland state law, non-compete agreements are void for employees who earn less than 150% of the state’s minimum wage rate. This threshold was about $46,800 annually (or less than $22.50 hourly) in 2025.[9]

Veterinary practitioners and technicians are also protected from non-competes,[10] even if they earn more than the threshold. Maryland’s ban extended to cover licensed health professionals in July of 2025 if they provide direct patient care and earn $350,000 or less in total annual compensation.

Non-compete agreements for healthcare workers who don’t meet those requirements are not banned, but they do have limits. The agreement cannot last longer than one year, and the geographic restriction cannot be greater than 10 miles from the healthcare worker’s former primary place of employment. If any patient requests information, employers are also required to tell them where the former employee is now practicing.

Non-competes outside of these limitations are evaluated using the “rule of reason” balancing test. Maryland courts will weigh an employer’s business interests against any hardship to the employee or the public interest to determine whether a non-compete is reasonable.[11] The test may consider factors such as:

• Trade secrets or confidential information that may be at risk;[12]
• Unfair restrictions on the employee’s earning capacity; or
• Limits on the public’s access to services.[13]

The general rule from Maryland caselaw is that a restrictive covenant can be enforceable if the requirements are limited with regards to the geographical area and/or duration.[14] A noncompete clause explicitly restricting an employee from working in a large area can be found reasonable if limited to the area where the employee actually worked and interacted with the employer’s customers.[15]

The court in Ruhl v. F. A. Bartlett Tree Expert Co. upheld a non-compete clause, finding that the two-year limitation was reasonably short. The court also found that the geographic restriction, which covered six counties, was reasonable because that is where the former employee actually provided services.[16]

In Hebb v. Stump, Harvey & Cook, Inc., however, the non-compete was only partially upheld. The agreement banned the former employee from soliciting the employer’s current customers or prospective customers that the employer was actively attempting to do business with for a period of two years.[17] The court found that “prospective customers” was an overly broad and difficult-to-determine category, making that aspect unenforceable. The agreement was otherwise acceptable. It didn’t specify a geographic area, but Ruhl had previously established that there were circumstances in which a large geographic area was still reasonable. The court in Hebb felt that the restrictions on current customers and duration made the non-compete sufficiently limited.

Aspects of a non-compete provision that are found to be unenforceable can be modified or struck using the “blue pencil rule.” The rule allows Maryland courts to remove only the unenforceable language while leaving the rest of the non-compete clause intact. Courts would be prohibited from rewriting or supplementing the original contractual terms, however.[18]

There may be overlap where an overly broad non-compete clause is referred to or connected to promises in other clauses. The court might feel that the non-compete clause should be unenforceable, but it needs to consider another question: Can it remedy the issue by only removing the unenforceable part, or would they have to rewrite other parts of the contract to adjust for the missing part? The latter would essentially result in a new contract with terms that the original parties did not create and agree to together.

The court in Aerotek, Inc. v. Obercian found that the non-compete clause was “impermissibly broad” because it prohibited the employee from working for any business that engaged, or was preparing to engage, with any aspect of Aerotek’s business.[19] The court also stated that the blue pencil rule could only be used if the unenforceable language is “neatly severable.”[20] The terms within the contested clause must be separate and distinct from other promises made in the contract.[21]

In Allegis Group, Inc. v. Bero, the court stated that restrictive covenants (i.e., non-solicitation or non-compete clauses) must be specific and help protect the employer’s interests.[22] The non-solicitation clause in the case was unenforceable because it extended to cover customers the former employee hadn’t interacted with through their job and even prospective customers, which the court in Hebb had already determined was an unreasonable limitation.[23] The court also declined to use the blue pencil rule to limit the non-solicitation clause because the court would have to rewrite the entire clause instead of taking out a single sentence to fix the issue.

The blue pencil rule only allows Maryland courts to remove language to make a non-compete clause enforceable. The rule does not allow the courts to add or edit any language. It may be impossible for the court to fix a non-compete clause without touching the rest of the contract, in which case the court has to turn back to the “rule of reason” balancing act and make an all-or-nothing decision regarding the contract.

Maryland continues to expand its restrictions — as evidenced by Maryland House Bill 1288 (Feb. 2025), where legislators proposed a total ban on non-competes.

Virginia

Virginia — unlike D.C. and Maryland — lands more on the side of non-competes. They are permitted for the most part, although Virginia does frown upon agreements that restrict trade. Non-competes are enforceable only if they are:

1. Narrowly drawn;
2. Not unduly burdensome; and
3. Consistent with public policy.[24]

Virginia does have a statutory ban as of 2020 on non-competes for “low wage” employees, which was initially defined as workers earning $76,081.14 or less annually. The ban has since been extended to cover all non-exempt employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act.[25]

Virginia courts do not allow for modifications using the blue pencil rule. Instead, Virginia either enforces or strikes an entire non-compete clause. Ambiguous clauses are usually construed in favor of the employee.[26]

Virginia courts examine many of the same factors that D.C. and Mayland look at when determining whether a non-compete is reasonable: the employer’s business interests; trade secrets; functional scope; geographic area; and duration.[28] Non-competes restricted to a 50-mile area and one to three years are generally found to be reasonable.[29] Non-competes with a duration of five years have been upheld in some rare circumstances.[30]

Specificity is, once again, key in a non-compete agreement. A Virginia court tossed out a non-compete clause in Home Paramount Pest Control Companies, Inc. v. Shaffer, finding that it was overly broad. The clause prohibited the former employee from working in the pest control industry in any capacity when it should have instead been limited to the activities the company actually engaged in. Conversely, the court in Preferred Sys. Solutions, Inc. v. GP Consulting, LLC found that the non-compete was enforceable despite the lack of geographic limitation because the clause was narrowly drawn to a particular project.[31]

Comparison of DMV Approaches

D.C. has the strictest approach against employers, banning non-competes for most employees. Even the few exceptions are protected by D.C.’s requirement for detailed and specific clauses. Maryland occupies a middle ground, only restricting non-competes for low wage workers and certain professions. Virginia has a broad allowance for non-competes, but it has a categorical ban for low wage/non-exempt employees.

D.C. and Maryland courts are more flexible when it comes to interpreting disputed non-competes. Both look at agreements on a case-by-case basis to determine whether they’re reasonable, and Maryland courts have the added ability to use the blue pencil rule to modify otherwise unenforceable non-competes into reasonable restrictions. Virginia courts do not allow for modifications and interpret the relevant laws more strictly. This approach can be helpful for employees in situations where the court determines an aspect of a non-compete is overly broad. In that case, the court would likely find the overall non-compete unenforceable and strike down the entire clause.

However, Virginia is comparatively employer friendly. The state is expanding its statutory employee protections, but courts are still cautious when interpreting restrictive covenants and err on the side of protecting employers’ interests. Maryland is incrementally broadening its ban and may, one day, fully prohibit non-competes. At the moment, D.C. is the most pro-employee and applies the most restrictions to protect workers.

Conclusion

Federal attempts at restricting non-competes have been stunted. The FTC now applies a case-by-case enforcement framework following the failure of its ban, and the NLRB has retreated from non-compete activism under Acting General Counsel William B. Cowen.

Thus, the regulation of restrictive post-employment clauses lies largely in the hands of state law. The DMV has a range of approaches when determining the enforceability of these contracts, but the area overall has significant restrictions against non-competes, especially for low-wage and healthcare workers. In the future, there may be movement towards broader bans. The FTC is surely keeping an eye on the DMV area as “laboratories for policy experimentation” that may help inform future federal law.

If you have already signed a non-compete or your employer is asking you to sign one as a condition of employment, call The Employment Law Group.

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[1] 16 C.F.R. Part 910.
[2] Ryan, LLC v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 746 F. Supp. 3d 369, 388 (N.D. Tex. 2024).
[3] D.C. Law 23-209, 68 DCR 000782 (Mar. 16, 2020).
[4] Non-Compete Clarification Amendment Act of 2022, D.C. Law 24-175, 69 D.C. Reg. 9910 (Sep. 21, 2022)
[5] Morgan Stanley DW Inc. v. Rothe, 150 F. Supp. 2d 67, 74 (D.D.C. 2001).
[6] Ellis v. James V. Hurson Assocs., Inc., 565 A.2d 615, 620 (D.C. 1989).
[7] Steiner v. Am. Friends of Lubavitch (Chabad), 177 A.3d 1246, 1262 (D.C. 2018) (citing Loral Corp. v. Moyes, 174 Cal. App. 3d 268, 279, 219 Cal.Rptr. 836 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985)).
[8] Robert Half Int’l Inc. v. Billingham, 315 F. Supp. 3d 419, 435 (D.D.C. 2018).
[9] See Md. Code Ann. § 3-716 (2019).
[10] See Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 3-716 (2025)
[11] See Becker v. Bailey, 268 Md. 93, 299 A.2d 835 (1973).
[12] See Silver v. Goldberger, 231 Md. 1, 188 A.2d 158 (1963).
[13] See Holloway v. Faw, Casson & Co., 319 Md. 324, 572 A.2d 510 (1990).
[14] Hebb v. Stump, Harvey & Cook, Inc., 25 Md. App. 478, 488, 334 A.2d 563, 569 (1975).
[15] Ruhl v. F. A. Bartlett Tree Expert Co., 245 Md. 118, 126, 225 A.2d 288, 293 (1967).
[16] Ruhl v. F. A. Bartlett Tree Expert Co., 245 Md. 118, 126, 225 A.2d 288, 293 (1967).
[17] Id. at 566.
[18] See Deutsche Post Glob. Mail, Ltd. v. Conrad, 116 F. App’x 435, 439 (4th Cir. 2004).
[19] Aerotek, Inc. v. Obercian, 377 F. Supp. 3d 539, 547 (D. Md. 2019).
[20] Id.
[21] See Deutsche Post Glob. Mail, Ltd. v. Conrad, 116 F. App’x 435, 439 (4th Cir. 2004).
[22] Allegis Grp., Inc. v. Bero, 689 F. Supp. 3d 81, 125 (D. Md. 2023), aff’d, No. 23-2023, 2025 WL 2141298 (4th Cir. July 29, 2025).
[23] Id.
[24] Omniplex World Servs. Corp. v. U.S. Investigations Servs., Inc., 270 Va. 246, 249, 618 S.E.2d 340, 342 (2005).
[25] Va. Code Ann. § 40.1-28.7:8 (West).
[26] Pais v. Automation Products, Inc., 211 V. 157 (1970); Lanmark Tech., Inc. v. Canales, 454 F. Supp. 2d 524 (E.D. Va. 2006).
[27] See Blue Ridge Anesthesia & Critical Care, Inc. v. Gidick, 239 Va. 369, 372, 389 S.E.2d 467, 469 (1990); Roanoke Eng’g Sales Co. v. Rosenbaum, 223 Va. 548, 552, 290 S.E.2d 882, 884 (1982).
[28] Home Paramount Pest Control Companies, Inc. v. Shaffer, 282 Va. 412, 415, 718 S.E.2d 762, 764 (2011).
[29] See Advanced Marine Enterprises, Inc. v. PRC Inc., 256 Va. 106, 501 S.E.2d 148, 155 (1998); Update, Inc. v. Samilow, 311 F. Supp. 3d 784, 789 (E.D. Va. 2018).
[30] See Zuccari, Inc. v. Adams, 42 Va. Cir. 132 (1997).
[31] Preferred Sys. Sols., Inc. v. GP Consulting, LLC, 284 Va. 382, 394, 732 S.E.2d 676, 682 (2012).

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Anita Mazumdar Chambers is a principal of The Employment Law Group, P.C.; Kirsten Fetrow is an associate at the firm.

Legal Options for Wrongful Discharge Using Bowman and Whistleblower Claims

By Kellee Boulais Kruse and Mary Anne Callahan

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When people hear the words “at-will employment,” they sometimes think this means they’re at the mercy of their employers. It’s a common misunderstanding that at-will means you can be fired at any time for any reason at all. This is not the case.

It is true that employers in at-will employment states, such as Virginia, have the discretion to fire their employees for a wide range of reasons. They might decide to fire someone for poor performance or budget cuts. Employers are also able to fire employees for no reason. This can make many employees feel blindsided or unfairly terminated.

However, this broad discretion does not exempt employers from following the law. At-will employment means employees can be fired for many or no reasons — but not for illegal reasons. At-will or not, the law is still the law, and the law is still there to protect employees from mistreatment such as discrimination or retaliation.

Employees who have been fired for illegal reasons might be able to file a lawsuit for wrongful discharge (also known as wrongful termination or wrongful dismissal). A wrongful discharge case generally begins when an employee is fired for engaging in protected activity. Perhaps you raised concerns about a workplace safety hazard or refused to submit an inaccurate form to a government agency. Protected activity can look like an employee asserting their own legal rights or pushing back against an employer attempting to violate public policy. Public policy, depending on the state, can include both state and federal constitutions, statutes, regulations, and judicial opinions.

Virginia recognizes public policy violations as a key exception to at-will employment. Previous court cases and state law establish situations in which it would be illegal to fire an employee.

The Bowman Claim

One of the earliest cracks in Virginia’s at-will system came from a 1985 case brought before the Virginia Supreme Court: Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville.[1]

In Bowman, a conflict arose when some bank employees, who were also stockholders, did not vote in favor of a proposed merger.[2] The employees were fired in retaliation. They were at-will employees, but the court nonetheless found that the terminations violated Virginia’s public policy.[3] The court’s decision made it clear that an employer can’t use the threat of termination to control how a shareholder votes.[4]

The Bowman decision gave Virginia employees the tort of wrongful discharge, a narrow but available pathway to fight against an unfair termination. There are three recognized situations in which an employee may have what’s called a Bowman claim:

1. The employee was fired for exercising a statutorily created right, such as using workers’ compensation benefits;
2. The employee was fired for refusing to engage in a criminal act; or
3. The employee’s termination was related to a public policy explicitly expressed in a Virginia statute, which also contains protections to which the employee is entitled.[5]

The last situation only applies when an employee is fired for doing something required by law or an employer, in terminating their employee, breaks a statute meant to protect the employee.[6] In either case, the employee would need to identify the specific statute that was violated.[7] They would also need to demonstrate that the statute clearly establishes protections for people such as the employee.

Bowman claims allow an employee to sue not only their employer but also potentially the individual person (typically a supervisor) who engaged in unlawful conduct and caused their termination.[8] The deadline to file a Bowman claim in court is two years after the employee’s termination.

Successful Bowman claims can address both the employer’s misdeeds and the employee’s actual losses in the form of punitive and compensatory damages.[9] Punitive damages are intended to punish illegal actions and deter similar behavior in the future, while compensatory damages are meant to compensate employees for emotional or reputational harm.

Punitive damages are only awarded in rare cases, however. The employer’s actions would have to be more than a mistake or poor judgment. An employee would have to be able to prove that their employer acted with reckless indifference or a conscious disregard for their rights.[10]

Virginia Whistleblower Protection Law Claim

Employees who have reported legal violations may also be able to bring a reprisal claim under the Virginia Whistleblower Protection Law (VWPL), which was enacted in 2020.[11] The VWPL states that an employer cannot fire or otherwise retaliate against employees who:

• Refuse to engage in a criminal act;
• Refuse to perform an act that violates a federal or state law or regulation;
• Make a good faith report of a violation of any federal or state law or regulation to a supervisor, government body, or law enforcement; or
• Are requested by or provide information to a governmental body or law enforcement official conducting an investigation, hearing, or inquiry into an alleged federal or state law violation by the employer.[12]

Employees pursuing a VWPL claim must be specific when identifying their employer’s legal violation. Courts have found that general complaints or expressions of concern — such as merely citing “misconduct” and “unethical” practices — is not specific enough to support a VWPL claim.[13] The employee would have to describe the employer’s illegal behavior in detail or identify a particular law that was violated.[14]

An employee raising a VWPL claim must file in court within one year of the retaliatory action.[15] There are currently no laws or case rulings to determine whether the VWPL can be extended to sue individual supervisors.

With respect to remedies, the VWPL allows a court to award: reinstatement; injunctive relief, which is an order requiring the employer to stop certain actions or take specific steps; compensation for lost wages, benefits, and other remuneration; and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.

Bowman claims vs. VWPL claims

Bowman claims and reprisal claims under the VWPL differ in several respects. Employees whose claims fall under a Bowman claim and the VWPL should consider pursuing both to maximize the potential remedies they may receive. Gaps in one claim can be handily filled by the other, allowing an employee to cover all their bases.

The remedies available under each type of claim vary. Emotional distress and punitive damages are generally not available under the VWPL, but attorneys’ fees can be recovered. In contrast, Bowman claims allow for punitive damages but not attorneys’ fees.

Pursuing both claims (if applicable) also gives one the ability to cast a wider net over who’s liable for their termination. Suing both the employer and the individual supervisor who caused the wrongful discharge may not be possible under the VWPL, but courts do permit Bowman claims against both.

Bowman claims, however, are usually the more challenging pursuit. The circumstances that allow for a Bowman claim are narrow, and courts carefully review the facts during the initial stages of a lawsuit to ensure the claim is valid. VWPL claims are broader, on the other hand. Employees only must show they reasonably believed a violation of federal or state law had occurred or was occurring.[16]

Each claim has its pros and cons. The coexistence of Bowman claims and statutory reprisal protections like the VWPL means wrongfully discharged employees have multiple options for relief in Virginia.

If you have been wrongfully discharged while working in Virginia, call The Employment Law Group to discuss your options.

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[1] Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville, 229 Va. 534, 540 (1985).
[2] Id at 540.
[3] Va. Code § 13.1–32, now Va. Code § 13.1–662
[4] Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville, 229 Va. 534, 540 (1985).
[5] Rowan v. Tractor Supply Co., 263 Va. 209, 213-14 (2002).
[6] Scates v. Shenandoah Mem’l Hosp., No. 5:15-CV-00032, 2015 WL 6143457, at *9 (W.D. Va. 2015) (citing Anderson v. ITT Indus. Corp., 92 F. Supp. 2d 516, 522 (E.D. Va. 2000)).
[7] Lawrence Chrysler Plymouth Corp. v. Brooks, 251 Va. 94, 98-99 (1996).
[8] VanBuren v. Grubb, 284 Va. 584, 592 (2012).
[9] Shaw v. Titan Corp., 255 Va. 535, 545 (1998).
[10] Giant of Virginia, Inc. v. Pigg, 207 Va. 679, 685 (1967)).
[11] Va. Code § 40.1-27.3.
[12] Id. at (A).
[13] See Colquitt v. Bon Secour Mercy Health, No. 4:21CV53, 2022 WL 479093 (E.D. Va. Feb. 16, 2022), aff’d sub nom. Colquitt v. Bon Secours Mercy Health, No. 22-1288, 2022 WL 17848949 (4th Cir. Dec. 22, 2022); Chenault v. RBI Corp., 108 Va. Cir. 529 (2021).
[14] Id.
[15] Va. Code § 40.1-27.3(C).
[16] Wood v. Bristol Virginia Util. Auth., 661 F. Supp. 3d 538, 550 (W.D. Va. 2023) (quoting Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307, 320 (4th Cir. 2003)).

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Kellee Boulais Kruse is a principal of The Employment Law Group, P.C.; Mary Anne Callahan is an associate at the firm.