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Breach of Employment Contract Litigation

Contract Interpretation, Materiality of Breach, Defenses, Damages

Date: Nov. 21, 2017
Location: Online
Organized by: Strafford Webinars
TELG participant: R. Scott Oswald

This 90-minute CLE webinar brings together five distinguished employment lawyers to discuss breach-of-contract claims between employers and employees — including complaints of wrongful termination, failure to pay under an agreement, and violation of the restrictive covenants in an employment contract.

The panel will provide practice tips while discussing matters including whether an implied contract exists (via an employee handbook, for instance); whether various breaches are material; and defenses that are available to both employees and employers.

TELG managing principal R. Scott Oswald is a faculty member for this webinar, along with attorneys from Baker & McKenzie, Jackson Lewis, and Dorsey & Whitney.

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» For a 50% discount on registration, click here

Whistleblower Retaliation Case Verdicts and Settlements

Whistleblowers are vital to the ethical and moral compass of big companies and other employers. However, whistleblowers often pay a high price for their commitment to the greater good. When they report wrongdoing such as unsafe work conditions or Medicare fraud, they put themselves at risk of retaliation through discrimination to outright termination to being made to endure a hostile work environment.

Fortunately, we have a number of federal laws that are meant to protect, and even reward, employees who report illegal, unsafe, or unethical conditions at the workplace, including the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Consumer Financial Protection Act, which provides strong whistleblower protections.  The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), which is part of the United States Department of Labor, handles the whistleblower provisions set forth in a number of different federal laws.  In addition, many state laws protect whistleblowers from retaliation, such as the California Whistleblower Protection Act, which applies to both public and private employees.

For your reference, here is a snapshot of some recent whistleblower retaliation cases.

Wells Fargo Ordered to Pay $5.4 million to Former Branch Manager Who Suffered Whistleblower Retaliation.

Wells Fargo N.A. abruptly fired a Los Angeles Wells Fargo branch manager after he reported several incidents of possible bank, mail, and wire fraud by two bankers he supervised.  The manager, who never received a poor job evaluation, was unable to find work in banking after Wells Fargo fired him in 2010.

The incident prompted an investigation by the U.S. Department of Labor’s Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).  At the conclusion of the investigation, OSHA determined that the manager’s whistleblower activity, protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, was a contributing factor in the decision to fire him.  Accordingly, in April 2017, OSHA ordered (i) the manager’s job reinstated, (ii) his personnel file cleared, and (iii) full compensation for back pay, compensatory damages, and attorneys’ fees.  The amount owed to the former manager was approximately $5.4 million.  Wells Fargo may appeal.  An appeal, however, does not stay enforcement of the OSHA order.

In Another Wells Fargo Case, the Bank Is Ordered To Pay $577,000 to Another Former Branch Manager for Wrongful Termination

A former branch manager in a southern California branch of Wells Fargo reported to her superiors that some of the bank’s private bankers were opening customer accounts and enrolling customers in bank products without the customer’s knowledge or consent.  Rather than address the problems that the whistleblower brought to its attention, Wells Fargo fired the branch manager for reporting the violations.

OSHA investigated the case and concluded that Wells Fargo retaliated against the branch manager.  OSHA ordered Wells Fargo to compensate her for back pay, compensatory damages, and attorneys’ fees, amounting to over $577,000.

$10.9 Million Jury Verdict For a City of Boston Employee Who Suffered Discrimination After Complaining About Disparate Treatment.

Ms. Chantal Charles, who is African-American and Haitian, filed a complaint with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination in 2011 based on the behavior of her supervisor.  As a result, Charles began receiving negative job evaluations.  The supervisor also refused to allow Charles to use her management title, denied overtime pay, flex hours, and other benefits that were provided to other employees who were not African-American or Haitian.

The case ultimately came before a Suffolk Superior Court, and the jury in the case awarded Charles $500,000 for emotional distress, $389,000 in additional pay, and $10 million in punitive damages.

OSHA Orders Amtrak to Pay a Whistleblower Employee $892,000, and Reinstate His Job.

An employee of Amtrak’s inspector general’s office raised concerns about an Amtrak contractor’s ability to do its job in 2010.  Specifically, the contractor was hired to test concrete on certain Amtrak tunnel projects, and the Amtrak agent had concerns about fraud and abuse on the part of the contractor.  A few months after raising the safety concerns, the Amtrak employee received a negative performance evaluation – his first ever.  He was later notified that his position was being eliminated.  Then, because he had difficulty finding another position in Amtrak, he was ultimately terminated.

The employee filed a whistleblower case with OSHA.  OSHA determined that the employee was a victim of retaliation because he raised safety concerns, and that Amtrak violated his protections under the Federal Railroad Safety Act.  OSHA ordered Amtrak to take the following actions:  reinstate the employee; and pay him $892,551 for back pay, punitive damages, compensatory damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs.

Health Center Employees Fired For Raising Tuberculosis Concern Compensated in a Consent Judgment.

In Hartford, CT, a health care facility did not adequately respond to a December 2011 tuberculosis exposure.  Accordingly, a VP of Operations, the Director of Nursing, and a Program Coordinator worked together to raise the awareness of employees, management, and the public regarding the potential dangers of the exposure.  Rather than applaud the three employees for their efforts, the CEO of the health center terminated them.

The subsequent OSHA whistleblower investigation revealed that the health center improperly fired the employees in violation of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970.  Before the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut, the resulting June 2017 consent judgment stipulated payment of lost wages (approximately $125,000) and neutral letters of reference.

$300,000 of Front Pay and Tuition Reimbursement to Victim of Whistleblower Retaliation.

An employee of Deltek Inc. believed that the company was disputing invoices solely to hide an IT budget shortfall, and that the disputes were otherwise baseless.  She was soon terminated from Deltek as a result of her reporting the baseless disputes.   The employee filed a complaint with the U.S. Department of Labor.

An Administrative Law Judge at the Dept. of Labor found that the employee was a victim of whistleblowing retaliation in violation of Sarbanes-Oxley.  The Judge awarded the employee four years of front pay, and ordered the company to maintain a tuition reimbursement program.  The total amount of the award was $330,352.  The decision was upheld on administrative appeal, and on appeal to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.

$275,000 of Back and Front Pay to a Whistleblower Pipefitter at John Deere & Co.

A pipefitter employed by John Deere & Co. reported unsafe working conditions at a John Deere plant.  When no action was taken, the pipefitter filed a complaint with OSHA.  The company then terminated the pipefitter.

John Deere ultimately settled with OSHA, and agreed to provide back pay in the amount of $204,315, and front pay damages in the amount of $70,685.

Kickbacks and Medicare Fraud

By David L. Scher and Anita Mazumdar Chambers

What Is a Kickback?

A kickback is something of value that’s illicitly given (or promised) in order to guarantee something else in return — usually something more valuable. In one classic scenario, a contractor pays cash under the table to a decision-maker; in return, the decision-maker steers a big project to the contractor.

In the medical context, doctors or other professionals may get kickbacks for referring patients to certain providers or facilities — or for prescribing certain drugs, or for recommending certain medical devices. These decisions are seldom best for whoever is paying the bills and, more important, they don’t put the patient first.

Kickbacks may be paid as straight bribes, but often they’re dressed up as consulting fees, speaker fees, and suchlike. Other common inducements include tickets to concerts or sporting events; meals at fancy restaurants; rounds of golf at expensive clubs; and invitations to all-paid conferences at ritzy locations. The quid pro quo is clear, if sometimes unspoken.

To ensure that decisions are made in the best interest of patients — and because U.S. taxpayers can get stuck with higher bills via programs such as Medicare — medical kickbacks have been targeted by the federal government. Congress has passed two major anti-kickback measures: The Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) and the Stark Law.

It’s common to see healthcare kickbacks discussed in connection with the False Claims Act (FCA), a powerful law that makes it illegal to defraud the federal government. Courts have often held that the violation of a kickback law automatically triggers liability under the FCA, if the government is paying at least some of the bills — and this connection was written into law in 2010 by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, also known as Obamacare.

Many healthcare FCA cases are filed by whistleblowers who have inside knowledge of kickbacks that are paid by drug companies, hospitals, clinics, medical specialists, device makers, pharmacies, home health providers, nursing homes, hospices — even ambulance companies that get paid by Medicare.

If a whistleblower’s information about kickbacks leads to a recovery by the government, the whistleblower may get a reward of up to 30 percent.

The Anti-Kickback Statute

The Anti-Kickback Statute makes it a crime to pay, offer, or solicit any remuneration to induce or reward any person for referring, recommending, or arranging for the purchase of any item for which payment may be made under a federally-funded healthcare program.

The statute covers bribes and rebates, plus other schemes that are designed — even partly — to get a physician to refer more patients for services that’ll be paid by government programs such as Medicare, Medicaid, or Tricare. There are some exceptions, known as “safe harbors,” but it’s hard to know whether they apply without detailed legal analysis.

Compliance with the AKS is required to participate in Medicare, which makes violations risky for providers that depend on government-insured patients. Fines can be substantial: Up to $25,000 per violation. Anyone can receive an illegal payment, including patients.

What does an AKS violation look like? Following are a few examples of schemes alleged by the U.S. Department of Justice. In each example, the accused wrongdoer settled the case without admitting violations.

  • A medical laboratory was accused of paying kickbacks to physicians and patients to induce the use of its blood-testing services. It had been paying doctors a “processing fee” for referrals and also waiving co-payments owed by patients, according to the DOJ. The lab paid $6 million to settle the case, which was brought under the False Claims Act.
  • A nursing home pharmacy agreed to pay $28 million to settle allegations that it got kickbacks from a drug maker that had disguised its payments as “grants” and “educational funding.” In return, the pharmacy ordered more of the company’s drugs for nursing home patients, according to the DOJ. The case was related to FCA claims that were settled by the drug maker, Abbott Laboratories.
  • A prison healthcare provider paid an administrator at the U.S. Bureau of Prisons for confidential information that helped it win contracts, according to the DOJ. The company settled the case for almost $2.5 million. Again, the case was brought under the FCA.

The Stark Law

The term “Stark Law” refers to a series of related measures that forbid doctors and their family members from referring federally insured patients to use businesses in which the physician has a financial interest, either via ownership or any form of compensation.

Such “self-referral” works just like a kickback: The referrer has a financial incentive to use particular services, possibly compromising patient needs and raising costs.

The Stark Law is narrower than the Anti-Kickback Statute, since it applies only to physicians, to specific health services, and to specific patients — namely, those insured by Medicare or Medicaid. Like the AKS, it has some carve-outs for arrangements that are truly fair; like the AKS, it imposes substantial fines for violations. It requires documentation of financial arrangements between doctors and other entities.

Following are some examples of Stark Law settlements announced by the DOJ:

  • An operator of New York hospitals improperly compensated doctors for referrals, in part by providing them with favorable office leases, the DOJ alleged. The hospital operator paid $4 million to settle the case, which was filed under the False Claims Act.
  • A California hospital overpaid its own chief of staff, in effect giving him an illegal incentive, and had unwritten or otherwise invalid financial arrangements with dozens of local doctors and practices, according to the DOJ. The hospital paid almost $3.3 million to settle the case, which also invoked the FCA.
  • A hospital system in Georgia provided excessive salary and directorship payments to one of its doctors, in violation of the Stark Law and the FCA, according to the DOJ. The hospital system agreed to pay up to $35 million to settle the case, while the doctor himself paid $425,000.

Blowing the Whistle on Kickbacks

If you have evidence of shady payments for medical referrals or prescriptions — including payments in kind, like lavish travel funded by a drug company — or if you know of doctors who refer patients to their own businesses, or businesses owned by family members, you may be able to help the government in its fight against illegal kickbacks and Medicare fraud.

What’s more, if your knowledge leads to a successful outcome under the False Claims Act, you may ultimately be eligible for a reward.

Many whistleblowers are worried about retaliation, including firing, by their managers — who may be the exact people who are giving or receiving kickbacks. The FCA forbids such punishment, and other laws may offer robust protection, too.

Our law firm has represented many medical professionals who became aware of kickbacks and Medicare fraud. Contact us if you’d like a confidential consultation.

Arbitration Agreements And FCA: Lessons From 9th Circ.

By R. Scott Oswald and Andrew M. Witko

Most arbitration provisions are a naked power play, wresting legal options away from the consumers, employees, and small business owners who must sign take-it-or-leave-it contracts with larger entities. The U.S. Supreme Court has been disappointingly tolerant of such maneuvers, implying in cases such as American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) will enforce virtually any litigation waiver that sports a fig leaf of mutual consent.

All the more notable, then, is a little-remarked opinion last month from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which rejected a company’s attempt to push its former employee into arbitration under a very broadly worded agreement that she had signed at hiring. The ruling built upon decisions by the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, and it offers some pointers for employees wishing to avoid the tilted field of forced arbitration.

Among the appeals court’s most useful holdings, which will apply mostly when employees want to sue on disputes that are tangential to their employment:

  • Even if an employee wouldn’t have asserted a claim but for his or her employment, such a claim doesn’t necessarily “relate to” that employment; and
  • If the facts underlying a legal claim would exist independent of the employee’s employment, such a claim doesn’t “relate to” that employment.

Along the way, the 3-0 decision in U.S. ex rel. Welch v. My Left Foot Children’s Therapy also signaled that so-called qui tam claims are likely, by their very nature, beyond the reach of private arbitration agreements — a timely carve-out as the Supreme Court mulls recent arguments in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, another case that seeks to limit what employers can force into arbitration under the FAA.

Background on the Case

At issue in My Left Foot was whether the arbitration agreement between Mary Kaye Welch and her former employer — My Left Foot, a therapy provider based in Las Vegas, Nev. — covered a later fraud claim brought by Ms. Welch on behalf of taxpayers under the False Claims Act (FCA). Borrowing a graceful phrase from the Eleventh Circuit, the panel unanimously concluded that, while broad, the language of these arbitration provisions cannot “stretch to the horizon.”

Ms. Welch, a speech pathologist, didn’t challenge the basic validity of her agreement, which in one provision purported to cover “any claim, dispute, and/or controversy … having any relationship or connection whatsoever with [her] … employment or other association with [My Left Foot].” Instead, she argued that her qui tam complaint wasn’t covered by this broad waiver or, alternatively, that the waiver couldn’t be enforced.

The essence of Ms. Welch’s FCA complaint was that My Left Foot had been submitting fraudulent claims for payment to the Medicaid insurance program. Originally signed by Abraham Lincoln in 1863, the FCA makes it illegal to deceive the federal government for financial gain; it includes a qui tam provision that allows whistleblowers to file an action on behalf of the government and — if they prevail — to receive a share of any recovery.

Nevada has a similar state law, which Ms. Welch’s complaint also invoked; the Ninth Circuit treated the statutes identically.

Both the U.S. and Nevada investigated Ms. Welch’s case but declined to assume control, so she opted to continue litigation on her own, which is allowed under both statutes. Soon afterward, My Left Foot moved to compel arbitration under the FAA. The company argued that, since both Nevada and the U.S. had declined to intervene, only Ms. Welch and My Left Foot remained as parties — and that their arbitration agreement applied.

At the trial level, Judge Miranda M. Du of the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada disagreed and refused to compel arbitration. Judge Du found that Ms. Welch’s arbitration agreement covered her FCA lawsuit — but that it couldn’t be enforced nonetheless, since the lawsuit’s claims were never Ms. Welch’s to dispose of.

According to Judge Du, FCA claims remain owned by the government even after a non-intervention. Sending this dispute to arbitration would improperly bind the U.S. and Nevada to an agreement that they had neither reviewed nor signed, she held.

Last month, the Ninth Circuit affirmed Judge Du’s decision on alternative grounds, holding that the arbitration agreement simply didn’t reach Ms. Welch’s FCA claims. In doing so, the court introduced a new rigor to the parsing of litigation waivers — and it raised the odds of beating an arbitration clause without offending the all-powerful FAA.

A Close Textual Analysis

Briefing the case for the Ninth Circuit, both sides focused mainly on ownership of FCA claims and whether a third party — here an FCA relator — may waive the government’s stake in litigation. In its decision the court called this an “interesting” debate, but didn’t feel obliged to weigh in. Instead, it relied on a close reading of Ms. Welch’s agreement to conclude that, as written, it didn’t apply to FCA claims.

The court drilled down on three provisions of the arbitration agreement — all of them fairly typical in employment contracts:

  • One provision specified arbitration for “all disputes that may arise out of the employment context.”
  • Another provision called for arbitration of “any claim between the Company and Employee arising out of or ‘related to’ the employment relationship.”
  • The broadest provision prescribed arbitration for “any claim, dispute, and/or controversy that either [Ms. Welch] may have against [My Left Foot] … or [My Left Foot] may have against [Ms. Welch] arising from, related to, or having any relationship or connection whatsoever with [Ms. Welch’s] seeking employment by, or employment or other association with [My Left Foot].”

Limiting the discussion to these three provisions was an early victory for Ms. Welch: My Left Foot had argued that an even broader provision ruled, covering “all disputes.” The court disagreed, saying that this uber-provision didn’t specify arbitration and was limited by more specific language elsewhere.

(Practitioners studying the opinion should brush up on their Latin: The panel leaned heavily on rules of construction such as generalia specialibus non derogant and verba cum effectu sunt accipienda.)

The court then grappled with the meaning of “arising out of” and “related to,” the operative phrases in the first two provisions listed above. While such language is broad, wrote Judge D. Michael Fisher, the opinion’s author and a Third Circuit judge sitting by designation, it is “not boundless.”

Both phrases “mark a boundary by indicating some direct relationship” between Ms. Welch’s claims and her employment, said Judge Fisher. To identify the boundary, he looked to cases from the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, both involving employees who were raped: A claim does not “arise out of” or “relate to” a plaintiff’s employment, he said, if the defendant could have engaged in the alleged wrongdoing even without an employment relationship.

Indeed, the opinion continued, in such cases the claim arises from the defendant’s alleged wrongdoing itself: Here, the fact that Ms. Welch observed fraud while she was employed by My Left Foot is “immaterial.” The legal basis of her FCA claim “would exist regardless of where [she] worked or observed fraud.”

Ownership of FCA Claims

OK, but what about the last provision above, which specified arbitration for claims with “any connection whatsoever” with Ms. Welch’s employment? While the Ninth Circuit admitted that this phrase is broader than “related to,” it avoided knotty distinctions by focusing on another part of the provision — its explicit statement that, for claims to be arbitrable, either Ms. Welch or My Left Foot must “have” them.

Here the panel agreed with Judge Du’s opinion below, up to a point: For qui tam claims, it said, the government remains the party in interest — it still “has” the claims, in other words — even after declining to intervene. But where Judge Du concluded that Ms. Welch’s arbitration agreement applied but couldn’t be enforced (since neither the U.S. nor Nevada agreed to it), the Ninth Circuit concluded that the agreement simply didn’t apply:

[T]hough the FCA grants the relator the right to bring [an] FCA claim on the government’s behalf, an interest in the outcome of the lawsuit, and the right to conduct the action when the government declines to intervene, our precedent compels the conclusion that the underlying fraud claims asserted in [an] FCA case belong to the government and not to the relator. … Consequently, … Welch cannot be said to own or possess them [and so] this suit does not fall within the scope of Welch’s arbitration agreement and is not arbitrable.

This close reading was a fitting response to the one-sided nature of arbitration clauses. Such provisions are, in general, contracts of adhesion that must be scrutinized strictly and, where viable under contract law, construed in favor of the weaker party. The FAA adds an extra dictate, according to the Supreme Court — to resolve ambiguities in favor of arbitration — but in My Left Foot the Ninth Circuit saw no ambiguity at all, demonstrating its clear-eyed view of the outcome demanded by justice.

“[W]e construe a contract that is clear on its face from the written language,” Judge Fisher wrote, quoting the Nevada Supreme Court, “and it should be enforced as written.”

The resulting strategy for employees is obvious, if they have a case that isn’t directly an employment matter: Rely on contract law as heavily as possible, pouncing on the textual weaknesses and drafting errors that are inevitable in any arbitration agreement. Then look to the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of what is (and isn’t) “related to” employment — especially if the employee can vindicate a third-party harm.

Do Defendants Just Need Better Waivers?

My Left Foot leaves an unanswered question: What if the defendant’s waivers had been written even more broadly, omitting the usual limitation to matters “related to” employment? In a footnote on the opinion’s last page, for instance, Judge Fisher conjured an imaginary arbitration agreement that covers “any lawsuits brought or filed by the employee whatsoever.”

Would this send an FCA claim to arbitration? After all, Ms. Welch’s qui tam complaint is a “lawsuit brought or filed” by her.

As Judge Fisher noted, employers are “free” to test this approach if they dare. Indeed, My Left Foot may prompt a wave of revisions to employment agreements across the U.S., dropping the “related to” limitation. We believe that courts will find such sweeping surrenders of rights to be unconscionable, however — especially when imposed at the moment of hiring, when a prospective employer holds so much power.

Plus, of course, a badly drafted waiver of all litigation rights runs the risk of being held invalid with nothing to backstop it. Employers should tread carefully.

How about slightly different language, also hypothesized by Judge Fisher in the same footnote: An agreement to arbitrate “all cases Welch brings against [My Left Foot], including those brought on behalf of another party”? Such a provision has identical problems of overbroadness — but it also raises the FCA matter squarely, purporting to waive a third party’s claim.

In our view, even the all-conquering FAA can’t hope to overcome the legal and policy arguments against a third-party waiver, particularly when the third parties are, under the FCA, millions of defrauded U.S. taxpayers.

Remember that the Ninth Circuit was clear on the underlying issue: An FCA claim belongs to the government. Since employee whistleblowers are often the only people with enough information to launch such claims, it’s hard to imagine a judge who’ll find that adhesion contracts can grant corporations an FAA-enforced pass on literally billions of dollars in fraud each year.

A good parallel — already settled law — is California’s Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA), which allows employees to file suit against their employers on behalf of the state, alleging labor law violations. As the Supreme Court of California has ruled, “a PAGA claim lies outside the FAA’s coverage … [A]n action to recover civil penalties is fundamentally a law enforcement action designed to protect the public.”

The same is true of the federal False Claims Act.

Meanwhile, My Left Foot doesn’t affect other disputes that are presumptively arbitrable via mutual agreement, including employee challenges to firings and other adverse actions. In a qui tam case, it’s unclear what would happen to a claim of retaliatory firing under the FCA — a frequent accompaniment to fraud allegations. Plaintiffs certainly should start both claim types in federal court, but should be prepared to move the employment claim to arbitration, if required.

(Ms. Welch didn’t make an FCA retaliation claim in her case.)

The bottom line: We’re still not certain, even in the Ninth Circuit, whether an arbitration agreement can apply to claims filed on behalf of a third party — and if it can, whether such an agreement is legally enforceable, especially in the qui tam arena.

Similarly, we don’t know for sure whether courts would support an arbitration agreement that purported to cover every single dispute a company has with its employees, regardless of any link to their employment.

We believe, however, that the answer in all cases must be “No.” Faced with test cases where public policy demands the avoidance of arbitration — the FAA notwithstanding — appellate courts so far have construed contracts to provide a narrow but hard-to-dispute basis for the right outcome. In this regard, My Left Foot follows the employee rape cases in the Fifth and Eleventh circuits.

Will employers press the issue by widening the scope of their forced arbitration provisions, in the hope that judges are reaching these decisions only reluctantly, because of leaky contract language? Likely so: FCA cases have the highest possible stakes — companies have been debarred from contracting, forced into bankruptcy, and shuttered after losing a big case. Anything is worth a shot, and defense counsel may see Judge Fisher’s footnoted hypotheticals as an invitation.

We believe they’ll discover that My Left Foot was, instead, a polite warning.

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R. Scott Oswald is managing principal and Andrew M. Witko is an associate in the Washington, D.C., office of The Employment Law Group PC, a law firm that represents employees who claim wrongdoing by their employers. Oswald is also vice chair of the Federal Bar Association’s Qui Tam Section.

DISCLOSURE: Oswald argued for Welch before the Ninth Circuit in U.S. ex rel. Welch v. My Left Foot Children’s Therapy. Witko was the primary author of the brief submitted to the Ninth Circuit on behalf of Welch.

(Note: This version has been slightly edited from the version published by Law360.)

What Will You Learn at Changing Currents 2017?

By R. Scott Oswald

“What will I get out of this event?”

As the moderator and faculty chair for the DC Bar’s Changing Currents in Employment Law, I get asked this question every year. And in 2017, more than ever before, I am confident that our annual CLE event will deliver an enormous return on just 3 hours of your time.

Below, in Q&A form, is a snapshot of what you can expect from Changing Currents 2017. I look forward to seeing you at 6 p.m. on October 24!

What is Changing Currents?

It’s an annual CLE hosted by the DC Bar, and it has been offered for almost a decade now. Each year we assemble the D.C. area’s leading lights in employment law — from both the management and employee sides — to review the most important legal trends affecting employees, employers, and their counsel. It’s a “race across the rooftops” of recent court decisions, legislation, and rule-making that may change the way that we practice law.

Plus, just as important as the review of substantive law, our accomplished panelists will be sharing practice tips they’ve gathered from years — decades, in many cases — inside and outside the courtroom.

This is cask-strength stuff, distilled into three hours.

Many attorneys attend this CLE year after year. Why? Is it really so different each year?

Absolutely. Here’s a great example: This year, just like last year, we will offer a panel on the state of sexual orientation case law, with a special focus on Title VII. Same topic as 2016 — yet the environment has changed profoundly. Many courts continue to find that Title VII forbids workplace discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity, but Jeff Sessions just reversed the Justice Department’s position on this issue. The EEOC is under pressure to follow suit, and suddenly the courts look like a last line of defense for LGBTQ employees. The law in this field is still evolving and, to be frank, I expect our discussion to have a far different outlook than in 2016.

And that’s just one example. We deliberately focus on areas of law that have seen sharp changes lately — or where a gradual evolution has lately come into focus.

You mentioned tips on best practices. Any previews?

I’m especially eager to hear from Susan Andorfer, counsel for the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. She’ll be on our panel about how federal agencies and their employees should handle hiring freezes — but we’ll also ask about other topics relevant to government employment, such as new EEOC case law on calculating damages in the federal sector. If you’re an employment lawyer who represents federal employees, as I am, her perspective will have great practical value.

Changing Currents is a collegial gathering. Attorneys who face off during litigation often take the opportunity to highlight the tactics they wish they saw from opposing counsel — tactics that can produce the fastest, best resolution. These are insights that simply aren’t available elsewhere.

What other topics will be covered? Is there a common theme?

There’s no formal theme, but most panels will deal to some extent with the emerging effects of a new — and very different — U.S. presidency. There’s a discussion of whistleblowing in the Trump era, for instance, and a discussion of political speech and conduct in the workplace. Not quite as tied to politics: A comparison between the rights of government employees and the rights of employees of government contractors. Very distinguished faculty on that panel — John Remy of Jackson Lewis and Morris Fischer, who has his eponymous firm.

Who else is on the faculty?

It’s a stellar lineup. On the sexual orientation panel, Carter DeLorme of Jones Day and Carla Brown of Charlson Bredehoft Cohen & Brown. Discussing political speech in the workplace, Kara Ariail of Holland & Knight and Noah Peters of Bailey & Ehrenberg.

On whistleblowers, Nat Calamis of Carr Maloney and Jonathan Tycko of Tycko & Zavareei. And joining Susan Andorfer on the hiring-freeze panel, Michelle Bercovici of Alden Law Group.

You talked about what’s different from last year. What’s the same every year?

Employment law is changing: That’s the biggest constant. The workplace is a crucible for broader tensions in society, because it’s where they get translated into dollars and cents — and it’s where many of us spend a majority of our waking lives. Sometimes our field of law leads society; sometimes it follows. Either way it’s always in flux. It requires diligence and creativity, plus an annual CLE like this, just to keep pace.

The other big constant is the excellence of our panelists. Each year I am humbled by the quality of attorneys willing to donate their time — not just on the day, but in weeks of preparation — to educate their fellow advocates. In 2017 we’re especially rich in talent: Just look at the list above. But I say that every year!

OK, I’m in. What do I do?

Register here and I’ll see you on October 24!

I’d love to attend, but I’m out of town on October 24. Help!

You’re in luck: You can attend via webinar.

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R. Scott Oswald is Managing Principal of The Employment Law Group, P.C. He was recently elected as a fellow of the College of Labor and Employment Lawyers.

Class Waiver Oral Arguments Show Room For Compromise

By R. Scott Oswald

In arguments Monday at the U.S. Supreme Court, the four most liberal justices lined up strongly against so-called “class waivers” in employment contracts — and even stepped in, on occasion, to offer better logic than the advocates at the lectern could muster.

The court’s conservative wing, on the other hand, was both low-key and opaque; Justice Neil Gorsuch didn’t talk at all. The conservatives who did speak, including Chief Justice John Roberts, engaged fully with the anti-waiver side, exploring its position without evident hostility.

None of the justices, meanwhile, seemed 100 percent behind attorneys for employers and the U.S. Department of Justice, who claimed to have no qualms about what Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg reviled as “yellow dog contracts,” take-it-or-leave-it agreements that require millions of employees to yield their right to act collectively — even in arbitration.

The outcome of Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis and its two consolidated cases, therefore, is a toss-up. A 5-4 pro-employer decision may be the safe bet, but the court showed tantalizing signs that it could reach a broader consensus that sets an outer limit, finally, on what may be pushed into arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).

One viable framework, based on Monday’s arguments: If a waiver is imposed on an employee and is so limiting as to deprive the employee of any effective right to coordinate with other workers under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), then it can’t be enforced via the FAA.

How would the actual contracts in these three cases fare against such a standard? It would be tempting for the justices to preserve their comity on the law and push the matter back to lower courts — and possibly to the wisdom of a National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) that argued on Monday in favor of employees, in opposition to the Justice Department, but that’ll likely shift its perspective with a new majority under President Trump.

The New Deal at Stake?

Monday’s arguments, the first of the court’s October 2017 term, were kicked off by Paul D. Clement of Kirkland & Ellis, a former U.S. Solicitor General who spoke for the three employers — Epic Systems, Murphy Oil USA, Inc., and Ernst & Young LLP.

Mr. Clement attempted to portray his argument for waivers as a routine extension of “well-trod” law. Employees sacrifice no substantive rights under the NLRA by agreeing to settle disputes via individualized, case-by-case arbitration, he said — they still can act together in the workplace, as the act requires, and are limited only when they get to an arbitral forum, where the NLRA doesn’t prescribe procedures.

Nonsense on all counts, said the liberal justices. In fact, said Justice Stephen Breyer, the matter is far from routine: If Mr. Clement were to win, it would undermine the “entire heart of the New Deal,” which rebalanced rights toward justice for workers. Justice Elena Kagan strongly denied that the NLRA, passed in 1935, covers only workplace coordination, while Justice Ginsburg denied that employees had “true liberty” to contract anyhow — employment agreements are coercive affairs, which is why the NLRA backstops certain employee rights.

In sum, they argued, the employers here effectively required a waiver of any coordinated action by employees — and therefore violated the NLRA. And while the FAA may demand enforcement of many agreements, it doesn’t stretch to illegal agreements.

Justice Anthony Kennedy, often a swing vote, provided the most vigorous counterpoint. Even if employees must proceed via individual arbitration actions, he said, they still can coordinate some actions: They can share a lawyer, for instance, as they pursue related arguments. Earlier Supreme Court decisions — including American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, for which Justice Kennedy was in a 5-3 majority — have enforced arbitration agreements even if they don’t offer the same benefits (or likelihood of justice) as regular litigation.

Justice Ginsburg noted that any coordination under Justice Kennedy’s scenario would be scant, however: Confidentiality requirements would ensure that. Plus the “core idea” of the NLRA, she noted a few minutes later, was to even the odds for employees by allowing them to act collectively. And as Justice Sonia Sotomayor would add at rebuttal, certain arguments are difficult to assert in individual actions — showing a common pattern of behavior against multiple plaintiffs, for instance.

Governmental Split

Mr. Clement was seconded and echoed by Deputy Solicitor General Jeffrey B. Wall, who had the strange task of arguing against the NLRB — another part of the same U.S. government, which brought the case against Murphy Oil. Such dissonance isn’t unheard of as the Trump administration repudiates Obama-era positions, but it’s unusual to allow government lawyers to argue both sides of a case at the Supreme Court.

Unlike a case heard last month at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, none of the justices even mentioned the historical curiosity, much less penalized Mr. Wall for it.

Just like Mr. Clement, however, Mr. Wall came under fire from the liberal justices, especially Justice Kagan. No conservative justice intervened — a notable contrast to the following performance by the NLRB’s Obama-appointed general counsel, Richard F. Griffin, Jr., who painted himself into several corners but was kindly rescued by both Justice Kagan and Justice Sotomayor.

Mr. Griffin delivered complex and wandering answers where both Mr. Clement and Mr. Wall had been concise. Facing technical questions from Justice Alito, who seemed genuinely to seek clarity in the employees’ position, Mr. Griffin failed to make sharp distinctions and received a blunt “I don’t understand your answer.”

“Is this one way to think about the question?” offered Justice Kagan, jumping in to address Justice Alito’s concern with a few cogent sentences.

“… And that’s all you’re saying here?”

“That’s — that’s entirely correct, your honor,” Mr. Griffin said in relief.

Mr. Griffin also was thrown by a hypothetical from Chief Justice Roberts, who asked him to compare an agreement that forbade class arbitration with an agreement that allowed class arbitration — but only in a forum that required a class of at least 51 employees, and that made no other provision for joint action.

Were both agreements unlawful?

Obviously, from an employee’s point of view, the scenarios should be equally disallowed in at least some circumstances, since they have the same effect, yet Mr. Griffin said the second scenario was lawful under the NLRA — and therefore could be enforced under the FAA. Several justices seemed surprised at the concession. Chief Justice Roberts even ran through it again, but the answer remained the same. The NLRA addresses only employer prohibitions, said Mr. Griffin, and doesn’t reach forum rules.

The upshot, as Justice Alito noted somewhat incredulously, seemed to be that employers would have a simple workaround even if they lost Epic Systems: They’d just need to find arbitration forums with favorable rules.

A Little Help from Friends

After the final advocate reached the lectern, Justice Sotomayor tried to undo the damage.

Daniel Ortiz, a law professor at the University of Virginia, spoke on behalf of the employees in the non-NLRB cases. He quickly established the stakes of the debate: About 25 million employees are currently restrained by the type of waiver at issue, he said — with many more to follow, presumably, if the court were to rule against his clients.

Mr. Ortiz played mostly to the liberal justices, invoking the late Justice Benjamin Cardozo and the pro-labor history mentioned by Justices Breyer and Ginsburg. But he also jumped on a chance from Chief Justice Roberts to revisit the 51-employee hypothetical, effectively distinguishing himself from Mr. Griffin.

Justice Sotomayor then helped with her own distinctions, noting that a 51-employee requirement for a class action would clearly raise problems if a company had only 49 employees. Further discussion sharpened the issue, as the justices seemed to converge on the pivot point in these cases: Does the agreement foreclose any effective joint recourse by employees?

Even for the conservative justices, it seemed, a complete shutdown of all concerted legal action, in all forums, would be too much — although this was a vibe rather than a statement. Maybe the wan benefit in Justice Kennedy’s scenario (employees share a lawyer, but not much else) will suffice for five justices as a fig leaf of “concerted” action that allows enforcement of the FAA.

But given the fairly generous tone of their questioning on Monday, it seems possible that a modest opinion from the left could reel in Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Alito, and possibly more.

—–

R. Scott Oswald represents employees in disputes with their employers. He is managing principal of The Employment Law Group, P.C., a law firm based in Washington, D.C.

(Note: This version has been slightly edited from the version published by Law360.)

U.S. ex rel. Welch v. My Left Foot Children’s Therapy: Opinion on Motion to Compel Arbitration

OPINION

FISHER, Circuit Judge:

Originally enacted in 1863, the False Claims Act (FCA) establishes a scheme that permits either the Attorney General, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a), or a private party, § 3730(b), to maintain a civil action against “any person” who “knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment” to an employee of the United States government. § 3729(a). When brought by a private party, an “enforcement action under the FCA is called a qui tam action, with the private party referred to as the relator.” United States ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York, 556 U.S. 928, 932 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). And when a relator initiates a FCA action, the United States has 60 days to review the complaint and decide whether it will intervene in the case. § 3730(b)(2), (4).

When the government intervenes, it assumes “the primary responsibility for prosecuting the action, and shall not be bound by an act of the [relator].” § 3730(c)(1). When it does not intervene, it is not a “party” to a FCA action for the purposes of certain procedural rules. See Eisenstein, 556 U.S. at 931. Nonetheless, the United States maintains some minimal involvement in all FCA actions. For example, in every FCA case, it remains “a ‘real party in interest,’” id. at 930, and retains specific statutory rights including rights to “intervene at a later date upon a showing of good cause,” § 3730(c)(3), request service of pleadings and deposition transcripts, § 3730(c)(3), and veto a relator’s decision to voluntarily dismiss the action, § 3730(b)(1).

In this case, Mary Kaye Welch alleges that her former employer violated the federal FCA and Nevada FCA by presenting fraudulent Medicaid claims. The United States and Nevada declined to intervene in the case and her employer moved to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. Holding that Welch had entered into a valid arbitration agreement that covers this FCA case, the District Court nonetheless declined to enforce that arbitration agreement. In its view, because FCA claims belong to the government and neither the United States nor Nevada agreed to arbitrate their claims, sending this dispute to arbitration would improperly bind them to an agreement they never signed. Though the question of the enforceability of a relator’s agreement to arbitrate FCA claims is interesting, our holding rests on a rather unremarkable textual analysis. Since we conclude that the plain text of Welch’s arbitration agreement does not encompass this FCA case, this lawsuit is not arbitrable, and we will affirm the District Court’s denial of the Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration on that alternate ground.

I.

In August 2013, Mary Kaye Welch applied for employment with My Left Foot Children’s Therapy, LLC (MLF), a small, family-owned company that provides functional therapy to children in the Las Vegas area. She was hired as a speech therapist that September and worked at MLF for just over a year. During the application process, Welch entered into a mutually binding arbitration agreement with MLF that provides:

I agree and acknowledge that the Company and I will utilize binding arbitration to resolve all disputes that may arise out of the employment context. Both the Company and I agree that any claim, dispute, and/or controversy that either I may have against the Company … or the Company may have against me, arising from, related to, or having any relationship or connection whatsoever with my seeking employment by, or employment or other association with the Company shall be submitted to and determined exclusively by binding arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act … . To the extent permitted by applicable law, the arbitration procedures stated below shall constitute the sole and exclusive method for the resolution of any claim between the Company and Employee arising out of ‘or related to’ the employment relationship.

ER 20 (underlining in original). The agreement then adds:

Included within the scope of this agreement are all disputes, whether they be based on the state employment statutes, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, or any other state or federal law or regulation, equitable law, or otherwise, with exception of claims arising under the National Labor Relations Act which are brought before the National Labor Relations Board, claims brought pursuant to state workers compensation statutes, or as otherwise required by state or federal law.

Id.

Shortly before Welch left MLF, she filed a sealed complaint in federal court alleging that MLF and its co-owners — Ann Marie and Jonathan Gottlieb — violated both the federal FCA and the Nevada FCA1 by presenting fraudulent claims to Medicaid and Tricare, a program that offers Medicaid-like benefits to service members. In 2015, the United States and Nevada declined to intervene and Welch amended her complaint. In that amended complaint, Welch alleges that MLF treated patients who could not benefit from therapy, provided and billed for unnecessary treatment, ordered therapists to draft inaccurate patient progress reports, and told therapists to use a single billing code for all services regardless of whether a more appropriate code would result in lower charges.

On October 19, 2015, the Defendants moved to compel arbitration of Welch’s FCA claims pursuant to the FAA and MLF’s arbitration agreement with Welch. Welch opposed that motion as did the United States and Nevada. On June 13, 2016, the District Court denied the Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration on the ground that Welch’s arbitration agreement did not extend to the United States or Nevada, the parties which owned the underlying FCA claims. This timely appeal followed.

II.

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 31 U.S.C. § 3732. We have jurisdiction under 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review a district court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to compel arbitration de novo. Sakkab v. Luxottica Retail N. Am., Inc., 803 F.3d 425, 429 (9th Cir. 2015).

III.

On appeal, the Defendants argue that we should reverse the district court’s denial of their motion to compel arbitration. They maintain that MLF’s arbitration agreement with Welch encompasses this FCA lawsuit and that the government cannot prevent enforcement of an arbitration agreement covering FCA claims when, as here, it has declined to intervene in the underlying FCA suit. In addressing those arguments, we must first determine whether Welch’s arbitration agreement with MLF encompasses the FCA claims at issue in this case.

A.

Seeking “to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements” and place them “upon the same footing as other contracts,” Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 (1991), Congress enacted the FAA in 1925. Under the FAA, private agreements to arbitrate are “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. Since the FAA “mandates — arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement has been signed,” Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218 (1985), when, as here, an arbitration agreement involves “a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce,” 9 U.S.C. § 2, our role is limited “to determining (1) whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists and, if it does, (2) whether the agreement encompasses the dispute at issue.” Chiron Corp v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 207 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).

In this case, Welch does not argue that her arbitration agreement with MLF is invalid. Instead, she maintains that these FCA claims do not fall within its scope because, contrary to what the District Court held, none of them are related to, arose out of, or were connected with her employment or other association with MLF. This argument turns on interpretation of her arbitration agreement with MLF—“a matter of contract” that requires us “to honor parties’ expectations.” AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 351 (2011).

Governing Law

Before turning to the text of Welch’s arbitration agreement, we must first determine the governing law. Under the FAA, the “interpretation of an arbitration agreement is generally a matter of state law,” Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 681 (2010), and since the arbitration agreement in this case was signed in Nevada by a Nevada resident and a Nevada-based LLC, the parties agree that Nevada law would govern any contract dispute here. In applying Nevada law to interpret Welch’s arbitration agreement, however, “the FAA imposes certain rules of fundamental importance” that must also guide our interpretation “including the basic precept that arbitration is a matter of consent, not coercion,” id. (internal quotation marks omitted), and the rule that “questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration.” Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).

“Because the FAA is at bottom a policy guaranteeing the enforcement of private contractual arrangements,” EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 294 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted), when examining the scope of an arbitration agreement, “[a]s with any other contract dispute, we first look to the express terms [of the parties’ agreement].” Chiron, 207 F.3d at 1130. If the text is plain and unambiguous, that is the end of our analysis in this case because we “must rigorously enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms” under both the FAA and Nevada law. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 294 (“While ambiguities in the language of the agreement should be resolved in favor of arbitration, … we do not override the clear intent of the parties, or reach a result inconsistent with the plain text of the contract, simply because the policy favoring arbitration is implicated.”); State ex rel Masto v. Second Judicial Dist. Ct. ex rel. Cty. of Washoe, 199 P.3d 828, 832 (Nev. 2009) (“In interpreting a contract, we construe a contract that is clear on its face from the written language, and it should be enforced as written.”).

The Arbitration Agreement

Turning now to the text, the arbitration agreement that Welch signed when she applied for employment with MLF contains two key sections. The first section, which is titled “Agreement,” includes three separate iterations of an agreement to arbitrate. The second section, which is titled “Included Claims,” provides that minus limited exceptions not applicable here, the scope of the arbitration agreement includes “all disputes, whether they be based on the state employment statutes, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, or any other state or federal law or regulation.” ER 20.

On appeal, the Defendants rely on the presumption in favor of arbitration, the breadth of the “Agreement” section, and the breadth of the “Included Claims” section to maintain that Welch’s arbitration agreement covers the FCA claims at issue in this case. In our view, however, it is solely the text of the “Agreement” section that dictates the scope of Welch’s arbitration agreement. Since the presumption of arbitrability is not in play if the text of the agreement is clear, that presumption plays no role unless the agreement is susceptible to an interpretation that covers this FCA case. And since it would violate several rules of textual interpretation to rely on the “Included Claims” section to define the breadth of the agreement, we believe that section is irrelevant to assessing the scope of Welch’s agreement unless the “Agreement” section first provides for arbitration.

Certainly, as the Defendants point out, the “Included Claims” section is broad and encompasses FCA claims insofar as it provides that “all disputes,” including those based on “any … federal law,” fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement. ER 20. There are nonetheless two problems with relying on this section to assess whether this case is subject to arbitration. First, the “Included Claims” section contains no agreement to arbitrate any disputes—rather, the “Agreement” section defines when the parties have agreed to arbitration while the “Included Claims” section explains the types of disputes that arbitration extends to when the parties have elsewhere agreed to arbitration. Second, the breadth of the “Included Claims” section cannot be read in isolation from the rest of the arbitration agreement, and the “Agreement” section provides for arbitration in much narrower circumstances than the “Included Claims” section.

This second point is particularly critical because had the parties wished to arbitrate every dispute encompassed in the “Included Claims” section it could have left the scope of the “Agreement” section at “any and all disputes whatsoever.” Instead, every provision in the “Agreement” section containing an agreement to arbitrate is followed by some plain language imposing a textual limitation that, to be arbitrable, the dispute must arise from, relate to, or be connected with Welch’s employment or association with MLF. Having chosen to include that language, we are bound to define the scope of this agreement by those limitations under two cardinal rules of textual interpretation. The first is the rule that the specific governs the general, or generalia specialibus non derogant, because the “Agreement” section is more specific than the “Included Claims” section. See, e.g., S. Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 891 (9th Cir. 2003) (“A standard rule of contract interpretation is that when provisions are inconsistent, specific terms control over general ones.”); Shelton v. Shelton, 78 P.3d 507, 510 (Nev. 2003) (“[A] specific provision will qualify the meaning of a general provision.”). The second is the interpretative principle of verba cum effectu sunt accipienda — that if possible, every word and every provision is to be given effect — because if the language about arising out of and relating to employment did not limit the scope of the arbitration agreement to those situations, it would have no purpose. See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936) (“These words cannot be meaningless, else they would not have been used.”); Sturges v. Crowinshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 202 (1819) (“It would be dangerous in the extreme, to infer from extrinsic circumstances, that a case for which the words of an instrument expressly provide, shall be exempted from its operation.”); Quirron v. Sherman, 846 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Nev. 1993) (“It is a well established principle of contract law … that where two interpretations of a contract provision are possible, a court will prefer the interpretation which gives meaning to both provisions rather than an interpretation which renders one of the provisions meaningless.”).

Having established that the scope of this arbitration agreement turns solely on the text of the “Agreement” section, we must now consider whether the text of the “Agreement” section is broad enough to encompass this lawsuit. As discussed above, the “Agreement” contains three different arbitration provisions. The first provision provides for arbitration of “all disputes that may arise out of the employment context.” ER 20. The second provision provides for arbitration of “any claim, dispute, and/or controversy that either I may have against the Company … or the Company may have against me arising from, related to, or having any relationship or connection whatsoever with my seeking employment by, or employment or other association with the Company.” Id. The third provision provides for arbitration of “any claim between the Company and Employee arising out of ‘or related to’ the employment relationship.” Id. (underlining in original).

Like the “Included Claims” section, these provisions are broad and capable of expansive reach. But as this Court has noted, there is a difference between a clause being “broad” and “unlimited.” N. Cal. Newspaper Guild Local 52 v. Sacramento Union, 856 F.2d 1381, 1383 (9th Cir. 1988). The first arbitration provision is limited to disputes that “arise out of the employment context” while the third is limited to claims “arising out of or ‘related to’ the employment relationship.” ER 20. And for three reasons, we cannot hold that the text of the first or third provision is broad enough to encompass this case.

First, contrary to Defendants’ position, the terms used in the limiting language of the first and third provisions are not boundless because both of the phrases, “arising out of” and “related to,” mark a boundary by indicating some direct relationship. As we have held, the words arising out of are “relatively narrow as arbitration clauses go,” Mediterranean Enters., Inc. v. Ssangyong Corp., 708 F.2d 1458, 1464 (9th Cir. 1983) (internal quotation marks omitted), and “understood to mean originating from[,] having its origin in, growing out of or flowing from.” Cont’l Cas. Co v. City of Richmond, 763 F.2d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir. 1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). And though we have recognized that the phrase “relate to” is broader than the phrases “arising out of” or “arising under,” we agree with the Eleventh Circuit that “‘related to’ marks a boundary by indicating some direct relationship; otherwise the term would stretch to the horizon” and “have no limiting purpose” in violation of the cannon of verba cum effectu sunt accipienda. Doe v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., 657 F.3d 1204, 1218 (11th Cir. 2011); see also N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995) (noting that if the phrase “relate to were taken to extend to the furthest stretch of its indeterminacy,” it would be meaninglessly empty because “relations stop nowhere” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Second, we are persuaded by the reasoning of the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, which have previously interpreted arbitration agreements covering disputes that “arise out of” or “relate to” a contractual or employment relationship. Though neither circuit decided this issue in the context of a FCA claim, we find their textual analysis compelling and instructive. In both cases, the courts found that a plaintiff’s sexual assault claims did not “arise out of” or “relate to” the plaintiff’s employment or workplace simply because the assault occurred at the plaintiff’s workplace or would not have occurred but for the plaintiff’s employment. As both circuits explained, the sexual assault did not “arise out of” or “relate to” the plaintiffs’ employment because there was no direct connection between their claims and employment where the defendant “could have engaged in” the same conduct “even in the absence of any contractual or employment relationship with [the plaintiff],” and a third party “could have brought the[] same claims . . . based on virtually the same alleged facts.” Doe, 657 F.3d at 1219–20; see also Jones v. Halliburton Co., 583 F.3d 228, 240 (5th Cir. 2009). The same is true here — this FCA suit has no direct connection with Welch’s employment because even if Welch “had never been employed by defendants, assuming other conditions were met, she would still be able to bring a suit against them for presenting false claims to the government.” Mikes v. Strauss, 889 F. Supp. 746, 754 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).

Finally, the fact that Welch observed the fraud while employed is immaterial under the first and third arbitration provisions. Since, contrary to what the District Court held, neither clause applies to “claims aris[ing] from observations Welch made while employed by MLF,” United States v. My Left Food Children’s Therapy, LLC, No. 14-01786, 2016 WL 3381220, at *3 (D. Nev. June 13, 2016), to interpret this clause to cover all disputes discovered while Welch worked at MLF would be “to read the arbitration provision so broadly as to encompass any claim related to [her] employer, or any incident that happened during her employment” whereas “that is not the language of the contract.” Jones, 583 F.3d at 241. Indeed, because Welch could have just as easily discovered the factual predicate of her claims in a different capacity, because Defendants could have engaged in the same fraudulent conduct absent any relationship with Welch, and because the legal basis of this FCA case would exist regardless of where Welch worked or observed the fraud, it is MLF’s act of fraudulent billing — rather than Welch’s employment — that these FCA claims “arise out of” and “relate to.”

Since neither the first nor third arbitration provision is broad enough to encompass this FCA case, the lawsuit is arbitrable only if it falls within the scope of the second arbitration provision. As Defendants note, this provision is clearly the broadest and may not require a direct relationship with Welch’s employment insofar as the phrase “any relationship or connection whatsoever with” is much broader than the phrases “arising out of” and “related to.” But we must again look carefully at the text of this provision, which indicates that it only covers a “claim, dispute, and/or controversy that either [Welch] may have against [MLF] … or [MLF] may have against [Welch].” ER 20.

Contrary to Defendants’ arguments, this case does not meet that textual requirement. This case involves no claim that MLF has against Welch. Nor can it be said to be a claim, dispute, or controversy that Welch “may have against [MLF].” ER 20. Indeed, though the FCA grants the relator the right to bring a FCA claim on the government’s behalf, an interest in the outcome of the lawsuit, and the right to conduct the action when the government declines to intervene, our precedent compels the conclusion that the underlying fraud claims asserted in a FCA case belong to the government and not to the relator. See, e.g., Vermont Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 773 (2000) (Noting that the “FCA can reasonably be regarded as effecting a partial assignment of the Government’s damages claim.” (emphasis added)); Stoner v. Santa Clara Cty. Office of Educ., 502 F.3d 1116, 1126 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The FCA makes clear that notwithstanding the relator’s statutory right to the government’s share of the recovery, the underlying claim of fraud always belongs to the government.”); Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Shalala, 125 F.3d 765, 768 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[A] qui tam plaintiff by definition asserts not his own interests, but only those of United States.”).2 The meaning of the verb “have” is “to hold in the hand or in control; own; possess.” Have, Webster’s New World College Dictionary (5th ed. 2014). Consequently, because FCA fraud claims always belong to the government, Welch cannot be said to own or possess them, and the FCA claims at issue in this case do not meet this arbitration clause’s requirement that the claim must be one that Welch “have against [MLF].”3 E.R. 20. Since this second clause, like the other two, is not broad enough to encompass this FCA case, this suit does not fall within the scope of Welch’s arbitration agreement and is not arbitrable.

IV.

For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the District Court’s denial of the Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration on the alternate ground that Welch’s FCA claims do not fall within the scope of her arbitration agreement with MLF.

AFFIRMED.

———-

1 Because we resolve this case based on the text of Welch’s arbitration agreement, any distinctions between the federal FCA and Nevada FCA are immaterial to our holding. We will accordingly refer to both sets of claims collectively as “FCA claims.”

2 Stoner is particularly instructive here. In Stoner, we concluded that a relator cannot pursue a FCA claim pro se. 502 F.3d at 1126–28. A pro se plaintiff can only “prosecute his own action in propria persona,” and “has no authority to prosecute an action in federal court on behalf of others.” Id. at 1126. Because a FCA claim is the government’s claim — and not the relator’s claim — and because the FCA does not allow relators to pursue any interest they might have in the claim separately from the government, we concluded that a pro se plaintiff could not bring such a claim. Id. at 1126–28. Thus, even where, as here, “the government chooses not to intervene, a relator bringing a qui tam action for a violation of [the FCA] is representing the interest of the government and prosecuting the action on its behalf.” Id. at 1126. A relator only has “the right to bring suit on behalf of the government.” Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Kelly v. Boeing Co., 9 F.3d 743, 743 (9th Cir. 1993)). We find no grounds upon which to distinguish our holding in Stoner from the contract language at issue here.

3 In so holding, we note that, once again, had the parties wished to agree to arbitrate FCA claims, they were free to draft a broader agreement that covers “any lawsuits brought or filed by the employee whatsoever” or “all cases Welch brings against MLF, including those brought on behalf of another party.” But having instead drafted a more limited clause that covers only those claims that Welch, rather than the government, has, Defendants cannot now argue that we should ignore this textual limitation.